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THE SENATORIAL CAREER OF WILLIAM P. FRYE
%
Ronald F. Banks
An Abstract of the Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of
Arts (in History). June, 1958.
William Pierce Frye served as a Senator from Maine for a period
of thirty years, 1881=1911.

During this time the United States passed

from a nation still binding the wounds of the Civil War to a nation
which achieved the status of a world power.

Frye was an active

participant in this growth and as much as any single individual,
symbolized the United States of this period.
Like his country, Frye was often impulsive as his opposition to
the Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations illustrates.

He was an artist at

"twisting the lion's tail" and never failed to exploit this ability
xdienever the position of his country or of himself could be enhanced
at the expense of Great Britain.
The Senator was impressed with the greatness of his country, a
greatness, which to him, was characterized by its bigness in industrial
production rather than by its intellectual and cultural achievements.
An analysis of his efforts to preserve this greatness, as he conceived
it, has been attempted b y investigating his position on such issues as
foreign commerce, the tariff, and the merchant marine.
It was Frye's contention that territorial acquisitions were of
prime importance to the United States if this country were to maintain
her greatness.

He championed, indefatigably, the annexation of Cuba

and Hawaii and several times advocated that the United States should
seize Canada and "hold her against the world."

It was Frye who was

personally responsible for the payment of twenty million dollars to
Spain for the Philippine Islands in. the Treaty of Paris,

18$?8 .

The Senator from Maine held positions of national significance.
He was a ranking member of the Senate Foreign P-elations Committee and
as Chairman of the Committee on Commerce a subsidy to merchant vessels
consumed much of his energies.

For fifteen he was president pro-

terapore of the senate and for five of those years served as acting
Vice-President.

From these positions he extended a profound influence

on national policy.

&n

attempt to analyze the results of this influ

ence has been the object of this thesis.

i
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INTRODUCTIOM
The year 1899 in Maine political history marks the zenith of the
influence of her men on shaping national policies.

"Maine was," in

deed, as Joe Cannon observed, "the whole shooting match."

Never be

fore or since can one point to a time when as many important govern
ment positions were held by Maine men.

Only the Presidency was

-eluding; the House being led by the capable Thomas B. Reed, Melville
B. Fuller, originally a Maine native, served as Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and William Pierce Frye was the president protempore of
the Senate, and due to the death of Vice President Hobart was acting
Vice President of the United States.

In addition, Maine claimed the

Secretary of the Navy, Long, and the Secretary of War, Alger, plus
numerous ministerships and consulates.
Why positions as important politically came to these men is
difficult to say.

Seniority can explain Reed and Frye but even sen

iority does not apply solely, since other public officials had, in a
few cases, served as long.

%

research has failed to disclose any

logical explanation for this power except that Maine was considered
politically strategic to Republican le aders of the day.

Nevertheless,

she represented only six votes in the electoral college and was con
sidered a reasonably "safe state" that could be neglected during
election years.

Indeed, it was Maine which furnished many of the

stump speakers for Republican campaigns in those years when such
figures were an integral part of the electioneering machine.
Only three Maine political figures have been approached by the
professional historian, namely, Fuller, Reed, and James G. Blaine.
Others such as Charles Boutelle, Eugene Hale, Seth Milliken, and

iii

Frye have been neglected.

This thesis proposes to shed some light on

a career which is comparable in many ways to those which have already
been publicized.

A

Recording Frye's Senate career is a prodigious task.

man of his stature and forty years service in Congress deserves to

be known and the author submits this very selective work as an at
tempt, albeit inadequate, to give Frye his deserved place in the his
tory of the United States.

Also the question, was his work commensu

rate with the time he took to accomplish his mission, is worthy of
consideration.

CHAPTER I
FRYE'S EARLY LIFE AND WORK
William Pierce Frye was born September 2, 1831, in Lewiston,
Maine.

His parents, Colonel John and Mrs. Alice M. Frye, were pio

neers of this town on the Androscoggin River.

Colonel Frye was finan

cially well-to-do for his day owning the controlling interest of the
Lewiston Manufacturing Company which he helped found in 183U.

The

Colonel1s grandfather had been a high officer in the English army and,
as was customary in colonial America, he had received a grant of land
for his participation in the French and Indian Wars.

Later, he became

a general for the Colonials in the American Revolution, and subse
quently he settled his grant and thereby founded the town of Fryeburg
located in western Maine near the N ew Hampshire border,
William's father was an active politician.

His title of Colonel

was not a military rank but rather an honorary one conferred on him as
a member of the Governor’s Council during the Civil War.

In addition

to being a councilman, he had previously served as selectman and town
treasurer of Lewiston and was later elected state senator from
Androscoggin County,
Few facts are known of William's boyhood.

His grandson, William

Frye White wrote a short and very selective family history, Lewiston
Miniatures.

From this study, which probably should be classified as

family folklore and reminiscences, a general picture of Frye's youth
can be drawn.

William was sent to Bowdoin, says White, mainly because

of his father's excellent financial condition.

A t Bowdoin, William

was a "live wire" who probably partook of the prevailing college
festivities, drinking, card playing, and roistering.

He was admonish-

2

ed for his "indecorum" by the Dean several times and for his irrev
erent excesses with the homely preachers of the day.
Several other students on the Bowdoin campus at this time (l81;6-

1850)

were to make great contributions to -American history during and

after the -American Civil War.

Oliver Otis Howard and Melville B.

Fuller are only two of the more conspicuous college associates of
Frye.

Despite his various diversions, he graduated from Bowdoin in

1850,

although in the third-quarter of his class which numbered only

thirty-two.^

Later, he was honored with L.L.D.'s from Bowdoin and

Bates and served on the Board of Directors of his alma mater.
From the Bowdoin campus, Frye went to Portland and studied law in
the office of William Pitt Fessenden, the distinguished Maine senator
and statesman.

He was admitted to the bar after this apprenticeship

and established, with a Mr. Came, a practice in Rockland, Maine.
In Rockland, he met Caroline Spear whom he married in 1852.
William White related that Frye was persona non grata with the Spear
family and was forced to meet Caroline clandestinely at the farm of a
sympathetic neighbor.
In 185U, Frye and his family moved to Lewiston and familiar sur
roundings.

He entered into a partnership with a brother of William

Pitt Fessenden.

Frye was apparently a very capable lawyer; but he

also began to show even greater political potential.

Nelson Dingley,

editor of the Lewiston Journal, said that Frye's law office was the

2
center of Lewiston and Androscoggin County politics.1
2

1.

Charles Lingley, Dictionary of American Biography. Vol. 7, p.5l.

2.

Edward N. Dingley, The Life and Times of Nelson Dingley, J r .,

3

His first experience in the active political arena
Register of Probate for Androscoggin County.

was as

From this position, he

was elected to the state legislature where he served from
1862 and 1863 to 1867.

1861

to

In 1866 and 1867, he was elected mayor of

Lewiston and from that office was elected Attorney-General of the
state serving in that capacity for three years.

One nineteenth cen

tury author praised his record in this office and said, "Some of his
prosecutions which he was called upon to conduct as prosecuting
officer were for capital offences celebrated in the annals of the
criminal cases of Maine."

3

Frye first ventured into national politics in 1871 as the repre
sentative from Maine's second district to Congress.
elevation to this seat both in

1862^

and in

1866^

He had sought

but withdrew before

the elections.

In 1869, he made a third attempt and was defeated by

S.P. Morrill.^

His career of ten years in the national House is in

teresting but not as noteworthy as his career in the Senate.

He

quickly established himself as an effective orator and, with Repre
sentative Blaine, Hale, and Lynch, served both the Republican Party
and the State of Maine well.
As a member of the Committee on Rules, he, with James Garfield 3
*
5
6

(Kalamazoo: Michigan, 1901), p. 36.
3. Jean Paul. Senator Frye of Maine, N.H. State Republican Committee
(189U?), P. 16.

0£.

U.

Dingley,

5.

Ibid.. p. 83.

6.

Ibid., p. 92.

cit., p. 65.

and others revised and codified the rules of the House.
perform a similar revision as a member of the Senate.

He was to
One of the more

interesting episodes in Frye's life was his part in the investigation
of James G. Blaine and the Little Rock Railroad - Mulligan letters
scandal.

Although Frye was not a parly to the scandal, it appears

that he definitely had a copy of the famous (or infamous) Caldwell
g
Telegram and therefore must have known more than we can ever ascer
tain.

Some years later, Frye's involvement in this affair was to get

him into a very discomforting position.
During the winter of 187U—75, Frye and Representative George Hoar
of Massachusetts were sent to Louisiana to investigate the legality of
q

the Kellogg government of that state.
Maty of Frye's speeches were directed at the English as his at
tack on the Geneva award in 1876 would confirm.

Unlike many of his

colleagues, he believed that the freed negro should be reconstructed
through education; he even made speeches demanding a pure ballot among
whites and negroes.

However, most of his stands were partisan and

seldom, if ever, did he rise to statesman like qualities.
In the election of

1876,

Frye and his colleague Representative

Hale served as Blaine's campaign managers at the Republican National
Convention.

At this convention in Cincinnati, it was the famed free

thinker Robert Ingersoll of Illinois who nominated Blaine.

After 7
8
9

7. William Robinson, Life of Thomas B. Reed, (New York: Dodd and
Mead, 1930), p. 65.

8.

David Muzzey, James G. Blaine. (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1931:),

p. 98.

9.

George Hoar, Autobiography of 70 Years, (New York: Scribners;

5

Ingersoll's eloquent address it was nearing darkness at the huge con
vention hall.

Frye, hoping to capitalize on the momentum from Inger-

soll's oratory, asked that the lights be turned on in order to push
for Blaine's nomination on the first ballot.

His request was greeted

with a chorus of "no's" which effectively eliminated any chance for a
Blaine nomination . 10

Eventually Blaine supported Rutherford B. Hayes

who went on to win from Samuel Tilden in the disputed election of 1876.
Whether Blaine expected favors from Hayes for his support is not
entirely clear.

However, he asked Hayes for the right to name one

cabinet officer from the New England area .111
5 Blaine called on Hayes
3*
2
at Senator Sherman's house to urge the President-Elect to appoint Frye
as attorney-general.
Hale.

13

12

Hayes refused but offered to appoint Eugene

It was now Blaine's turn to decline since he wished to remove

Frye as a rival of Hale.

Blaine had wanted Hale to succeed Senator

Hannibal Hamlin who was about to retire but Frye stood in the way.1^
Hayes noted in his diary that Blaine and Hamlin were both disgruntled
and that "Blaine seemed to claim it (appointment of Frye), as a con
dition of good relations with me ,"1^

1903), p. 79.

10 .

Muzzey,

0£.

cit. , p.

100 .

11. Louis Hatch, Maine, A History, (New York: American Historical
Society, 1919), Vol. II, p. 586.
12. Harry Barnard, Rutherford B. Hayes and His America, (New York:
Bobbs-Merrill, 195U)7_ pTTIIFI
13.

Hatch, o£. cit., p. 386.

lit.

Ibid., p. 386.

15.

Charles Williams, Ed., The Life of R.B. Hayes, (Ohio Arch. Soc.,

6

President Hayes' appraisal was correct.
onized the Maine senator.

His refusal only antag

Blaine and the conservative wing of the

party were very unhappy with Hayes' other cabinet appointments,
particularly Carl S c h u r z ; ^ furthermore they publicly revealed their
displeasure.

On March

6,

1877, Blaine delivered a speech in the

Senate which challenged a statement of policy made by Hayes in his in
augural address.

Blaine's intention was to force the President to

appoint Frye to the cabinet.

17

However, Hayes was not to be moved by

this criticism and Maine still failed to gain a cabinet member.

Frye

returned to the House apparently unmoved by this incident.
While Frye and Hale were members of the House, Maine also had two
nationally famous Senators in the upper house.

One of these gentlemen

Hannibal Hamlin had been a pillar of the Republican Party since his
defection from the Democratic Party in 1856.

He had served as

Lincoln's Vice President during his first term and was subsequently
elected a senator from Maine.

The other gentleman, James 0. Blaine,

had been Speaker of the House of Representatives and a prospective
presidential candidate in 1876.
considered for the nomination.

Four years later, Blaine was again
He was still in the national limelight

because of his leadership of the Republican element which had recently
and successfully forestalled a fusionist (Democrat and Greenback)
attempt to prevent seating Republican legislators in his home state of
Maine.

Emerging from this battle victoriously, he was bent on getting1
6
7

1928), Vol. II, p.

2k.

16.

Ibid., p.

17.

Ibid., p. 17.

2k.

7

the nomination.

To help him do this, he chose, as previously, Frye

and Hale to serve as his campaign managers.
The anti-Blaine, pro-Grant forces were led by Roscoe Conkling,
Simon Cameron, and John Logan.

1 ft

The convention was pervaded by

hostilities between Conkling and Blaine; the party had split into two
irreconcilable factions.

Perhaps Frye and Hale were too amateurish

and provincial to handle the experienced Conkling otherwise Blaine
might have received the nomination."*"^

Conkling rose to answer Frye on

several occasions and always had complete control of the situation.
Once he humiliated Frye by answering him "in a way that was half sneer
and half insult."

Only once, when Frye seconded Blaine's nomination,

did he display any of the poise and eloquence which in later years was
to make him one of the most sought after campaign speakers of his time.
Referring to Blaine's capable handling of the fusionist threat in
Maine, he roused the convention to "tumultous cheering" by his de
scription of the pilot who had safely brought to port the tempesttossed ship, "the State of Maine."
Freighted with the precious principles of this Re
public, with the rights of American citizenship, with
the privileges guaranteed by the Constitution, she
was battling the waves. The eyes of the whole nation
were upon her. They beheld with intense anxiety the
perils to which she was exposed. A true man was at
the helm. Sagacious himself, he made even the foolish
wise and courageous. He inspired "the timid. Strong,
he strengthened the weak, calm, he restrained the1
8
9
2
0

18. Theodore Smith, James A. Garfield, Life and Letters, (New Haven:
Yale Press, 1925), VoTT~IT7"pi 91:7^
19.

Ibid., p. 961.

20.

Ibid., p. 970

8

impetuous and brought the imperiled ship with the
precious cargo into the port of safety---. Take
that man, wise, stout, and brave, for your leader
and he will surely bring you to safety and vic
tory— -.n^The election of 1880 placed James Garfield in the White House,
He had received the nomination because of Blaine's willingness to join
the Garfield forces in an attempt to keep Grant from being nominated.
As a reward to Blaine, the President made the Maine senator his Sec
retary of State,
A few months earlier, Senator Hamlin had finally resigned his
seat.

The legislature was responsible for the selection of his suc

cessor and the two most prominent possibilities were Frye and Hale.
The situation of party conflict which Blaine had feared in 1876 when
he had asked Hayes to appoint Frye to a cabinet post, now presented
itself.

Hale had lost his House seat in the Greenback revolution of

1878 and was now retired.

Frye, on the other hand, had retained his

seat and would probably become the next speaker of the House.

Despite

the efforts of Frye's supporters, the senate seat was given to Hale
because Frye had a place in Washington; also Blaine would soon resign
his senate seat to become the Secretary of State vacating his seat for
Frye.

22

Indeed, in order to discourage an open battle for his seat,

Blaine prematurely announced that he was to become the Secretary of
State much to the disgust of G a r f i e l d . ^

21.

Muzzey,

0£.

On March 15, 1881, Fjye was 2
1
3

cit., p. l5?.

22. Leon Richardson, Life of William Chandler, (New York: Dodd and
Mead, 19U0), p. 261*.
23.

Hatch, o£. cit.. p. 619

9
duly elected to the Senate as he had been promised and served there
continuously until his death in 1911, a period of thirty years.
Blaine's concern for Frye is understandable.

As has been

shown, Frye had been Blaine's campaign manager in 1876 and

1880

as

well as one of his most stalwart supporters during the Little Rock Fort Smith scandal.

Moreover, his eloquence in seconding Blaine's

nomination had heightened the presidential aspirant's obligation to
his fellow partisan.
On assuming his new duties as senator, Frye was to continue much
of the program which formerly had been championed by Blaine.

One

cause espoused, which will presently be considered, was the BayardChamberlain fiasco which succeeded in establishing Frye as one of the
more powerful men in the Republican Party.

Chapter II
FRYE AND THE BAYARD - CHAMBERLAIN NEGOTIATIONS
The majority of diplomatic historians agree that, between 17831911, the North Atlantic fisheries question vexed American Secretaries
of State more persistently than any other single issue.
Since John Adams had salvaged fishing rights for New England in
the Treaty of Paris, 1783, and subsequent negotiations had secured
United States' position, New Englanders had depended heavily on the
products derived from the seas.

Therefore, any attempt by the British

to negate the hard fought concessions to the advantage of Canada was
bound to arouse the indignation of New England congressmen.
By the Convention of 1818, American fishermen were allowed to take
forever "fish along certain portions of the southern, western, and
northern coasts of Newfoundland, and along the coasts, bays, harbours,
and creeks from Mount Joly --

through the Streights of Belleisle."^

Also, the United States received the liberty "to forever dry and cure
fish in the unsettled bays, harbours, and creeks" of the southern
coast of Newfoundland, and the coast of Labrador.

However, the most

important provision of the Convention agreement and that which pertains
to Frye’s life is the so-called "three marine mile clause."

By this

clause the United States renounced the right to cure, dry, and take
fish within "three marine miles of any coasts, bays, creeks, or har-

2
bours" of Canada except for those previously cited.

In addition, the

1. Charles C. Tansill, Canadian-American Relations 1875-1911. (New
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 19b3), p.L.
2.

Ibid., p.5.

11

United States was permitted to enter the ports of Canada to obtain
water "and for no other purpose whatever."^
In 1853} Canada^attempting to circumvent the more restrictive
clauses of the Convention of 1818, seized a number of American ships
off the Canadian coast.
vessels.

Matthew Perry was sent to protect the American

Subsequently, England, anxious to avoid trouble, agreed to

negotiate the Treaty of Washington in 185U, also known as the MarcyELgin agreement.
Under the terms of this treaty, the United States received in
shore fishing rights denied her by the Convention of 1818.

Also,

Canadian vessels were permitted to fish along the shores of the United
States down to the 36th parallel, which includes Chesapeake Bay.^
More important to both countries as a whole were the reciprocity
arrangements concerning agricultural products of the two countries.
The Marcy-ELgin agreement continued in force through the American
Civil War.

However, because Canada showed sympathy toward the Confed

erate States of America and increasing animosity toward reciprocityagreements, the United States announced that the Marcy-Elgin Agreement
would be terminated March 17, 1866,^
The termination of this treaty deprived American vessels of the
right to fish inside the three-mile limit, thus the status of the
fisheries question reverted to the agreement reached by the Convention

3.

Ibid.

ll. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People,
(Hew York: F.S. Crofts and Co., 1952), p. 277.
5.

Tansill, o£. cit.. p.

8.

12
of 1818.

As a result, Canada passed additional retalitory legislation

which caused relations to worsen between the two neighbors.
During this time Hamilton Fish, Grant's Secretary of State, began
negotiating the Alabama Claims with Great Britain.

As these negotia

tions proceeded, the fisheries question once again reared its ugly
head and, as a result, in a new Treaty of Washington of May

8,

1871,

provisions were made for -toe settlement of the fisheries question as
well as other pressing diplomatic problems.
Under articles eighteen through twenty-four, the United States
was granted all rights she had enjoyed b y the Convention of

1818,

and

the added right to "take fish of every kind, except shell fish, on the
coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbours, and creeks, of the prov
inces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick -—

Prince Edward Is

land" providing that its subjects do not damage private property or
interfere with British fishermen.

6

To compensate for this loss,

Canadian fishermen were authorized to fish along the eastern seacoast
of the United States as far south as the thirty-ninth

parallel.

To

further compensate for what Canada felt to be an unfair treaty, a
commission was appointed to determine an amount of money to be paid
7
Canada for this liberal grant of her fishing territory.
The commission met at Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1877.

It was com

posed of three members, two being favorable to British interests and

6 . W.M. Mallory, Treaties. Conventions, etc., (Washington: 1910),
Vol. 1, p, 708.
7.

Ibid., p. 709.

13

the other favorable to -American interests.^ This body awarded to
9
Canada the sum of $3,300,000. It should be noted, however, that Mr.
Kellogg, the American commissioner, refused to concur with the major
ity opinion.

Kellogg's refusal indicates the dissatisfaction with

which some Americans, especially New Englanders, viewed the a w a r d . ^
On November 21, 1878, the payment was made under protest with the
United States declaring that it could not accept the findings of the
commission but would pay the sum to maintain "good faith in treaties
and the security and value of arbitration between nations-- Thus
the fisheries question that many hoped was permanently settled by the
Treaty of Washington in 1871 was only temporarily solved, and even
then only in a spirit of ill will and mutual distrust.
Senator Frye was extremely dissatisfied with the Treaty of Wash
ington and the decision of the Halifax Commission.

On January

10 ,

1883, he proposed a joint resolution in the Senate which asked for the
termination of articles eighteen to twenty-six and thirty of the
Treaty of Washington.

These articles pertained to the fisheries

question; essentially Frye sought the abrogation of existing treaty
arrangements with Canada.

12

Congress passed Frye's resolution and gave the required two years

8 . Ellis P. Oberholtzer, A History of the United States Since the
Civil War, (New forks McMillan Co., 1931J, Vol. IV, p. UsB.
9. House Miscellaneous Documents, "The Halifax Award" (Washington:
G.P.O. 1893-9U), Vol. 39, p. 7U5.
10.

Ibid., p. 7U5-U6.

11.

Ibid., p. 733.

12.

Congressional Record, U7 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 10lfLo

Ill

notice to Canada abrogating the clauses which guaranteed American
rights to inshore fishing, bait purchasing, and transshipment of
13
cargoes within Canadian waters.
The United States had numerous reasons for wishing to abrogate
the fisheries articles of the treaty.
popular in the United States.

The Halifax award had been un

Also, the fact that under the Treaty,

Canadian fish had been allowed to enter this country duty free had
annoyed New Englanders.

Canada was benefiting more than the United

States financially, due to the absence of ary tariff and this caused
envy among many members of the fisheries industry.

Incidents like the

Fortune Bay affair in 1878 added greatly to the discontent.

In this

affair American sailors, engaged in taking herring in Fortune Bay, New
foundland, were attacked by natives who destroyed one of the American
seines and forced them to stop fishing.

Such occurrences were too

common to be i g n o r e d . ^
Officially the Treaty of Washington was to expire July

1,

1885,

and therefore the pertinent provisions derived from it would become
void on that date.

One consequence of this termination would be the

reversion of the fisheries agreements to the Convention of I 8l 8 .
change was the desire of the fishing interests.

This

Consequently, on

January 31, 1885, President Arthur issued a proclamation warning Amer
ican fishermen of the impending expiration of present privileges en15
joyed under the treaty.

13.

However, Grover Cleveland's election in the

Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1933),

p. Uo5.

.............

llj.

Oberholtzer, oj>. cit., p. bh7-kh8.

15.

Tansill, og. cit., p. 13.

15
autumn of 1881* abruptly changed the status of affairs.

c: ^ 1 : ';aly.

Unlike President Arthur, the Democratic Cleveland was guided by a
sense of national rather than sectional interest.

He believed in low

ering the high tariff walls erected by the protectionists and was
particularly determined to improve relations with Canada.

Before

Cleveland assumed office, President Arthur had rejected as "impracti
cal" Canadian offers to extend the terms of the Treaty of Washington
until January

1,

1886.^

This rejection by a "lame duck" President

and Cleveland's desire to improve relations with Canada confused the
fisheries question even more.
On March

6,

1885, Thomas F. Bayard assumed the office of Secre

tary of State for President Cleveland} he was forced to deal with the
problem immediately.

The New England fishing interests, he felt, had

to be content with the program of the preceding Administration, since
they had been primarily responsible for the impending abrogation of
the treaty provisions.

However, would the fishing interests then be

satisfied with the rights granted them by the Convention of 1818,
which was to be re-instated on July 1, 1886?
for the purchase of bait.

No provisions were made

Fishing vould be prohibited within "three

marine miles of any coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors" of Canada except
"along certain portions of the southern, western, and northern coasts
of Newfoundland-- and most restricting of all, Yankee fishermen
would have no right of transshipment of fish over Canadian land into
the United States.1
6
7
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Possibly, Secretary Bayard foresaw that the act of abrogation had
caused more harm than benefits for the fishing industry.

He may have

thought that New England did not realize the implications of their
decision.

Surely, she did not think Canada would extend the rights of

transshipment, fishing within the three mile limit, and the curing and
drying of fish, particularly, since Canadian fish could not now enter
the United States free of duty.

Bayard soon discovered the answers to

his questions when he accepted an extension of the terms of the Treaty
of Washington offered by Canada, an extension that Arthur had rejected.
The extension was to be, singly, a modus vivendi until more satisfactory arrangements could be made.

1 ft

Secretary Bayard found that any postponement of the tariff charges
on Canadian fish would not be tolerated by the New England fishing
industry.

Talk circulated that every fisherman along the New Jingland
10

coast considered rising to arms if the tariff charges were delayed.
As diplomatic correspondence between Bayard and Canadian officials
was exchanged, it became clear that no arrangement could be consum
mated along the lines of reciprocity.

Indeed, it was doubtful if any

satisfactory arrangement could be negotiated.

20

This fear by the fishermen is more meaningful when one considers
the general distrust of the Administration held by these interests.
They feared that the first Democratic President in twenty-four years 1
8
9
2
0

18 .

Tansill, o£. cit., p. 18.

19.

Ibid., p.

20.

Ibid., p. 19.

17.

17

wished to negotiate a treaty designed to allow Canadian fish to enter
the United States duty free.

In view of President Cleveland's

public utterances, there was justification for such a fear.
in his message to Congress December

8,

Cleveland,

1885, included a recommendation

for an appointment of a commission empowered to negotiate a settlement
upon a "just, equitable, and honorable basis" of the entire fisheries
questxon.

22

Senator Frye with his colleagues, Edmunds of Vermont, and Hoar of
Massachusetts assumed the championship of the New England fisheries.
Hoar and Edmunds, like Frye, were Senate types.

Republican in their

politics and partisan in their views toward the Democratic party, this
triumvirate was high protectionist and vehemently opposed to conces
sions to Canadian fish products.

They remembered the Halifax Commis

sion only too well, and were not pleased with its decision.
O n January 5, 1886, less than a month after Cleveland's message
to Congress, the war between the executive and the legislative branches
commenced.

On that date Frye introduced into the Senate a resolution

requesting the Secretary of State to transmit "ary and all correspond
ence and information in the custody of the State Department relative to
the extension of certain fishing rights and privileges under the Treaty
of Washington from July

1,

pq
1885 to January 1886."

The resolution, as

was customary, was agreed to unanimously.
Two weeks later on January 18, 1886, Senator Frye introduced 2
1
3

21 .
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another resolution which answered Cleveland's request for a commission:
"-- Whereas the fishing rights were settled for ten
years by a commission appointed under the Treaty of
Washington at a cost of $5,500,000 paid in money
and a remission of duties amounting in the ten years
to about $ 6,000,000 more,
and
Whereas the effect of the terms agreed upon by
the said commission was further an increase in the
Canadian fishing fleet of five-hundred vessels and
of ten-thousand seamen, with a corresponding de
crease in our own fleet and sailors, without any
appreciable benefits to the people of the United
States: Therefore, be it resolved by the Senate of
the United States, that in the opinion of the
Senate the appointment of a commission clothed with
such powers ought not to be provided for by Congress.
A discussion followed this resolution.

.

Senator Morgan of Alabama,

a member of the Foreign Relations Committee with Frye, argued that the
modus vivendi was simply a temporary arrangement.^

Frye answered

that the British Minister had requested a commission, not the fisher26
men who were satisfied.

Contemptuously, he said that New England

had enough of commissions to settle fisheries problems, "I say that
the United States paid $15,000,000 without ever receiving one single
27
cent in return."

He continued.

"I remember that in the Treaty of 1783, Great
Britain conceded to us the right to fish on the
Grand Banks and Banks of Newfoundland. Wonderful
magnamity on the part of Great Britain! Not one
of those banks was within 25 miles of the British
possessions and running from that to 150 miles...,
Why did she not concede us the right to breathe*
2
5
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the air of heave n ? " ^
With his own brand of logic, Frye continued his vehement verbal
attack on the administration and the idea of a commission.

He argued

that the fishermen did not use the inshore fishing banks because the
fish had shifted feeding grounds and the only reason Great Britain
desired a commission was to "get five and a half millions of dollars
out of us literally for nothing."

29

Thinking, realistically, of Great

Britain's need for American friendship, he further demanded that "we
use a get tough policy."

Such a policy would not endanger the United

States; Great Britain could not afford to alienate the United States
since, "there never was a country in the history of the wide world so
under a mortgage to keep the peace with us as Great Britain is today.
Neither they nor we seek any war.

30

Senator Morgan offered a different explanation; he retorted that
because the first commission failed, it was no reason to indict a new
31
one.

Morgan also insinuated that, perhaps, the duty on fish had

something to do with Frye's reasoning.

Frye persistently maintained,

despite Morgan --- "that we desire nothing and therefore we must in
evitably be the loser by a c o m m i s s i o n . H e

added later that he did

not wish an increase on the tariff and admonished Great Britain to
"let us, for Heavens sake alone; —

28.

Ibid., p. 703.

29.

Ibid.

3°.

Ibid., p. 70U.

31.

Ibid.

32.

Ibid., p. 705.

33 .

Ibid., p. 708.

we can take care of ourselves."332
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Much comment ensued because of this move of the Republican Senator
from Maine.

The modus vivendi had lapsed January 1, 1886, as had been

agreed and Canada could be expected to enforce any violations of the
Convention of 1818 to force the United States to negotiate.

This

possibility and its inherent dangers were appreciated by the State
Department "54 but not by the New England fishing interests and their
spokesmen.

One Maine newspaper applauded Frye's efforts and hoped that

the resolution would "have the effect to cause the Senate to see this
question in its true light and prevent the sacrifice of the interests
of American fishermen to the greed and cunning of British diplomacy."^
While the Senate was engaged in other business, Nelson Dingley,
Jr., Maine's Representative from the second district, was mustering
support for Frye's resolution in the House.

Dingley presented a number

of memorials from citizens and organizations within his constituency
supporting Frye's resolution.

They based their opposition, as did

Dingley, on the assumption that the commission would allow Canadian
fish into United States ports duty free, an assumption that later
proved to be incorrect.
Because both the Senate and House appeared to be averse to the
idea of a commission, Canada had commenced an illiberal enforcement of
the Convention of 1818.

She also claimed to have passed legislation

which prohibited American fishermen from buying bait in Canadian ports
despite the fact that Canadians benefited from these transactions as*
3
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much as Americans did.-^

Thus, American shipowners were threatened

with prosecutions for violating the Convention of 1818 and the recentlypassed legislation prohibiting the purchase of bait.
While the House was debating a proposal similar to Frye's and
Canada was passing legislation, the Senate twice refused to act on
Frye's resolution.

Finally, on April 5, 1886, Frye introduced a re

port by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee embodying the substance
of his earlier resolution.'®

He also read a resolution adopted by the

Fishing Exchange of Portland which advocated sending armed vessels in
to the Atlantic to protect American fishing vessels from the molestations of Canadian authorities ,

'7

The Portland Exchange request had

been prompted by the refusal of Canada to allow United States' fisher
men to buy bait as guaranteed by the Convention of

1818.

Frye main

tained that Americans had a right to go into any Canadian port, except
for purposes of "piracy or for fishing within the three mile limit.
He pointed out that Canadian vessels had frequently been permitted to
enter Portland and Gloucester to obtain provisions.

Frye ended his

speech with a warning that if one American vessel was seized by
Canadian officials he would introduce a bill "to close the United
States' ports against all British colonial fishing, freight, and pas- 3
7
8
9

37. Tansill, 0£. cit. . p. 20. David Wells reported the pitiful con
ditions under which Newfoundlanders lived and their dependency on
this source of income,
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senger

vessels ... until Canada lifted her restrictions upon us,"^-

On April

9,

1886, the original resolution by the Foreign Rela

tions Committee was re-introduced.

This time, Frye appealed to broad

national interests for support of the measure rather than to his own
sectional colleagues.

He reasoned that "unobstructed without bounty

or subsidy ... there is no reason why our fishing fleet shall not, in
ten years, number 15>,000 vessels, manned by

200,000

-- sailors."^2

Frye failed to mention the fact that this would aid Maine more than
the rest of the country.

His policy was to destroy the Canadian fish-

eries by closing United States' markets to her. ^
The basic problem was how could the United States keep Canadian
fish from entering the country.

"Is there any good reason why she

/Canada/ should have it /the U.S. market/?" asked Frye.
men will be sailors in our next war.

"Our fisher

Why then should these men be

selected for sacrifice, and their rights be surrendered to the tender
mercies of British diplomacy?"^

Frye's answer, as always, was for a

higher tariff on Canadian fish; a tariff which he had denounced in
January when he introduced the resolution originally.^
With Dingley leading a successful battle in the House, Maine was
well represented in its fight to revive the fishing and shipbuilding
industries.

On April 13, 1886, Frye's resolution, as embodied in the
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Committee on Foreign Relations' resolution, passed the Senate by a
vote of thirty-five to ten.

Senator Morgan one of the more outspoken

antagonists of the New Ehgland Nationalism voted for the measure.
To Secretary Bayard this debate by the Senate was a "mere blowing
of fish horns" for partisan r e a s o n s . ^
were yet to come.

However, the real difficulties

On May 7, 1886, the American vessel David J , Adams

was seized by Canadians in Digby Basin.

Bayard immediately protested

•this act as unjustified and admonished that serious consequences might
arise if such seizures continued.^
Bayard's reasoning in this case.

Especially significant was

He said that American fishermen did

not want to dry or cure fish on the interdicted coasts.

He pointed

out that bait was no longer needed to fish inside the three mile limit
and, hence, there could be no possible justification for the seizure
) ft
under the Convention of 1818.

This analysis had a striking sim

ilarity to the position that Frye had been presenting since 188$.
Despite British sympathy with the American stand and an apparent
desire to settle the issue, the Canadians continued to seize American
vessels.

Bayard was disturbed over the David J, Adams affair and his

concern increased when he learned that the case was to be tried in a
Canadian vice-admiralty court.

He appointed two men, William Putnam of

Portland, Maine and George W. Biddle of Philadelphia, to represent the

k9
United States in the litigation.
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Both men were distinguished lawyers

2k
and authorities on international law . '’0
Putnam reported to Bayard on June

h,

1886, that the Canadians had

acted on very inconsequential charges which could easily have been
over-looked.

Putnam was also unable to discover the laws which alleg-

edly prohibited the -Americans from purchasing domestic bait.

At the

same time Senate Republicans increased the tempo of their attack on the
Secretary of State.
tive action.

Bayard was now in a position which demanded posi

One possible recourse was the use of force; Secretary of

the Navy, W.C. Whitney was making preparations to send a fleet into
Canadian waters and the use of this fleet might persuade Canada to
withdraw her orders to seize American vessels.

52

Frye introduced, as he had warned, an amendment to the Dingley
shipping bill to exclude Canadian vessels from United States' ports
until such time as Canada would stop seizing v e s s e l s . ^
quickly passed the Senate and was agreed to by the House.

The amendment
Although one

New York paper asked for moderation until all means of peaceful adjust
ment proved ineffective,'’^ Maine newspapers supported Frye's proposal
and recommended any action which would procure "justice?

55

On May 27 the resolution passed the House as a rider to the
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Dingley bill.

The New York Times argued that the high tariff was the

real issue involved and questioned how this resolution was to be im
plemented,^
Congressional action had displayed a lack of confidence in Secre
tary Bayard’s efforts to exhaust all peaceful means.

In July, Port

land fishermen threatened to boycott Canadian goods and demanded that
Frye's proposal be implemented.

57

On July 25, the Senate resolved

that the Committee on Foreign Relations investigate the "rights of
American fishing vessels within the North American possessions of the
Queen of Sreat Britain, and whether any rights of such vessels have
been violated...."

Senators Frye, £dmunds, and Saulsbury were appoint

ed to the sub-committee to begin its interrogation September 30,
1886.5
6
5
7
58
Between July 25 and September 30, the stage of the controversy
shifted from the halls of Congress to the "stumps" of the Maine woods.
The Congressional and state elections were to be held in September and
Frye, a great campaigner, participated to insure Republican seats even
though his own seat was not at stake.

Blaine was also an active par

ticipant in the off-year election, primarily, as titular head of his
party, but also, to keep his name before the nation's voters in prep
aration for the presidential election of 1888.

The Kennebec Journal

from August to September 16, recorded the schedule of addresses to be
made.

From August 13 to September 21, Frye delivered a speech every
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day except Sundays.

He appeared frequently on the platform with Reed,

Blaine, and such national Republican leaders as McKinley and Allison,
The participants, including Frye, concentrated on the fisheries
"sell out" by the administration and the usual Republican positions on
the tariff, commerce, and the treasury surplus.

On August 21, Frye

delivered an address at Houlton, Maine, which harmed Blaine more than
it aided him.

Referring to the Mulligan Letters and the Little Rock

scandal, Frye said in his usual descriptive style,
"You take a magnificent bridal dress with its
ribbons and splendid laces, and put it on exhib
ition with a little inkspot on its skirt, and you
see nothing but that inkspot. Now the people of
this country, with an exquisite fidelity to the
best interests of the nation, saw the little bit ^
of a smirch on the skirt of Mr. Blaine's coat...""3^
Frye tried, unsuccessfully to repair the damage caused b y his
oratory by referring in a later speech to Blaine as the American

60
Gladstone.

The Nation, America's leading liberal journal, predicted

that Frye would find himself in trouble because of this speech.

"It is

a very remarkable statement to come from a friend of Mr. Blaine.
there was a smirch was there?

So

Well, Mr. Frye tell us what it was.

We

do not agree with him about its being a 'little bit of a smirch'
The New York Times commented that Frye was a "terrible friend. Mr.
Burchard's little alliteration must have seemed to him a mere accident
compared to this.

The terrible feature of Mr. Frye's remark is its
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truth."62
Frye denied ever making the statements^ and Blaine insisted that
Frye was misquoted.

Nevertheless, the damage had been done and the

impression remained indelible on the minds of the -democratic opponents.
In late September, Frye, fresh from a smashing Republican victory
at home, returned to Washington to assume his position on the sub-com
mittee appointed to investigate the fisheries question.
Between September 30, and October

6,

Senators Frye, Edmunds, and

Saulsbury interrogated fishermen in Boston, Portland, Gloucester, and
other ports along the coast.

The committee members were more con

vinced, if convincing they n e e d e d ^ that American fishermen had been
grossly maltreated.

6*5

However, for the sake of truth, it should be

noted that the members of the committee received an unilateral ed
ucation because all of the interviewees were Americans.
The fishing season was over for 1886 and Congress did not convene
until December.

During this interval, Secretary Bayard attempted to

effect a solution by the use of the commission.

However, Frye and

others kept the atmosphere of animosity alive by publicly pronouncing
that Canada needed American markets and the United States could dictate
its own terms to h e r . ^
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On January 19, 1887, Senator Edmunds introduced a resolution
based on the committee's findings.

Frye concurred in this report and

actively supported its recommendation that the President be authorized
to protect the rights of American fishing vessels by denying the ports
of the United States to other countries, meaning of course, C a n a d a . ^
This resolution contained Frye's basic assumption; Canada would be
forced to grant the United States concessions because she needed the
American market.

However, if Canada did not submit, the New ihgland

fishermen would be freed from Canadian competition in United States'
markets.

The New England fishing econoiry would be stimulated by either

proposal.
In support of this resolution Frye, on January

2k,

1887, reiter

ated that Canadian seizure of United States' vessels was unwarranted
because none of the provisions of the Convention of
violated by Americans.

1818

had been

He asked that the measure pass and then "you

will never hear of another outrage by the colonies of Great Britain
while the world lasts.
This resolution appears to be the catalytic agent needed by the
State Department to open negotiations.

Frye and his colleagues had

forced Canada toward negotiations, while their intentions were probably,
to bully her into acceptance of their position without negotiations.
New England Senators may have sensed the conciliatory attitude of
Canada and wished to avoid any negotiations which, they feared, would
reach agreements disadvantageous to their interests.
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sivene ss caused Senator Hoar of Massachusetts to introduce a measure
on February

2k,

1887, prohibiting negotiations with Canada concerning

"the reduction, change, or abolition of any of our existing duties or
imports."^

This proposal apparently portended the impossibility of

any form of settlement; it also confirmed Secretary Bayard’s belief
that the Republican leaders were "reckless, selfish, and mercenary ."^0
On February

2k,

Frye, Morgan, and Hoar were appointed Senate con

ferees to determine the wording of the bill introduced by Senator
Edmunds.

The bill passed the Senate and the House and President

Cleveland signed it on March 3, 1887.

71

Presidential reasons for signing the bill were understandable.
Concurrence offered a way to remove the pro-British label from the ad
ministration while simultaneously forcing Canada to accept an arrange
ment on the fisheries question even if hopes for tariff reductions were
dead.

Both were diametrically opposed to Republican intentions.
Though Cleveland signed the Edmunds bill, he was opposed to the

Hoar resolution.

Bayard and Cleveland both considered it to be an un

precedented attempt to limit the President’s treaty making p o w e r s . ^
Indeed, Senator Morgan stated that consultation with the Senate on
appointments for commissions was unnecessary; he argued that such
executive authority was implicit in the presidential treaty-making
powers.

Cleveland apparently subscribed to Morgan's interpretation
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since he authorized Secretary Bayard to appoint a commission anyway.
In October, Bayard named as commissioners, James B. Angell of the
University of Michigan, William Putnam who had served as counsel in
the David Adams case, and known as one of the foremost experts on
international law, and himself,

73

British representatives were Joseph

Chamberlain, Sir Charles Tupper and Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the
British Minister to the United States.

With the exception of West,

the delegation proved to be inexorably determined to give Canada a
"fair" treaty .^ 1
Nelson Dingley, the champion of the fisheries in the House, wrote
that the fishermen would be content with the commission.

They had

feared the possibility that the commission would consider more than
the issues of the line of the three mile limit and the rights of .Amer
ican fishermen in Canadian ports.

Dingley had feared that they would

negotiate the free admission of Canadian fish into the United States.
However, he admitted finally, that he was confident that Messrs.
Putnam and Angell (not Bayard) would not undertake more than the disputed question,

7£

Dingley expressed the feeling s of his Maine con

stituents and preferred to wait for the treaty to reach the Senate be
fore opposing any of its provisions.

He was, in short, willing to

give the commission a chance.
Dingley's attitude coincided with that of the New Xork Chamber of
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Commerce and Jay Gould.76

Apparently some big-business interests

favored a peaceful solution to the problem.

Secretary Bayard became

quite optomistic about a treaty's chance in the Republican controlled
Senate.7?

However, this optimism proved to be premature.

On November 7, an unidentified New England Senator released a
statement to the Boston Post noting that President Cleveland had to
obtain Senate confirmation of the American commissioners.
ment predicted that the Senate would reject them.

The state

Even if the com

mission met and produced a treaty, the Senator declared that the Senate
would reject it.
On November 22, 1887, Frye was interviewed by a reporter of the
Boston Journal, a Blaine organ.

In answer to questions relating to the

commission appointments Frye replied, "there is either hopeless igno
rance or a desire to completely surrender to Sir Lionel West^®..,
Bayard has a soft side for E n g l a n d . . , A s k e d t o explain Cleveland's
attitude Frye said, "he simply doesn't know... Blaine would have at
once availed himself of the power granted by Congress and the outrages
would have ceased."

Frye insisted, still, that America should close

her ports to Canadian ships, rather than attempt a peaceful solutionB
Throughout the treaty negotiations, the British delegation pressed
for tariff reductions.

Secretary Bayard knew that such concessions
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would jeopardize any treaty which might reach the Senate and refused
to consider them .®0

-Actually, Bayard favored a reciprocity agreement

but the partisan attacks by Frye and his colleagues had destroyed any
hopes of success along that line.

-Also, bitterness engendered by the

Halifax Award had not yet subsided.
The Bayard-Chamberlain agreement, representing two months' work
by the commission was presented to the Senate on February 20, 1888.
It was accompanied by a message from President Cleveland urging its
approval.

Cleveland, Bayard, and the Canadian representatives con-

At
sidered the settlement to be just and equitable. x

Essentially the

terms of the treaty were as follows: (1) A mixed commission would be
appointed to delimit the territory named in Article I of the Convention
of

1818.

(2) Free navigation for American fishing vessels in the

Straits of Caseo were assured. (3) Free access to the ports and harbors
of Canada to purchase wood and obtain water, with a few minor restric
tions was guaranteed. (Lt) The three mile limit should be measured not
from headland to headland but from the low water mark, again with
minor exceptions. (5) Although no provisions for reciprocity were in
cluded in the treaty, Article XV said, "Whenever the United States
shall remove the duty from fish-oil, whale oil, seal oil, and fish of
all kinds (except fish preserved in oil)" then the United States
(fishermen) could purchase, without license, bait, ice seines, lines,
and all other supplies besides the privileges of transshipment of
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Op
catch, and shipping of crews,0<:
Immediately the Republican press attacked the treaty as a "sell
out" and American diplomacy was depicted as being at its "low water
QO
mark," J Nelson Dingley described the agreement an "abject surrender"
and said, "it certainly can not get the necessary two-thirds vote
One Bangor, Maine, paper reported confidently "that this one-sided
agreement would be promptly rejected by the Senate.

The Eastern

Daily Argus, the most powerful Maine Democratic newspaper, considered
the treaty a "practical solution of the great q u e s t i o n , a n d roundly
condemned Frye for attacking the treaty before the Congress had a
On

chance to consider it.

The Maine newspapers, predominately Repub

lican, opposed the treaty because it would have enhanced Cleveland's
prospects for re-election in the fall.
Republican presidential aspirant.

Maine's Blaine was a likely

A s one Republican Senator was

quoted, "The fact is that just now we cannot afford to let this ad
ministration do anything."^®
The first official onslaught of the treaty was initiated by Frye
on March

1 $,

1888.

He requested that the President send to the Senate

82. The Treaty is recorded in Senate Executive Documents, 50 Cong.,
1 Sess., 1887-88, Vol. 10 , No. 1 7 ^
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the minutes and protocols of the commission's meetings.89

The resol

ution did not include the usual addition to such requests, namely, that
transmission of said documents be contingent upon whether the request
90
would be detrimental to the public service.'
Bayard thought this resolution was "without precedent in form and
substance.

He had practically given up the treaty anyway.

When

the Chamber of Commerce of New York City and other big business organ
izations had voted against it, he prepared for the worst.
On May 7, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made its report.
The majority report, signed by Frye, attacked the treaty viciously.
But President Cleveland was their main target because he had defied
the Senate's wish that no commission be formed.

It recommended that

the "ill advised negotiations" should not receive the support of the
Senate.

92

The minority report, in contrast, was an extended investigation of
the fisheries question since 1818.

It was well prepared and consti

tuted a cogent defense of the treaty.

Senator Morgan, who also de

fended the treaty in the Senate, and Secretary Bayard were its chief
a u t h ors.^

The report argued that Cleveland's refusal to obtain

Senate approval of his three commissioners was consistent with a long
list of precedents.

The report urged that the treaty be supported un-
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animously by the Senate while charging that the critics of the treaty

9h
were simply over-zealous partisans searching for political ammunition.
In an open session, rather than executive session, the treaty was
brought to the floor of the Senate on May 29, 1888.

Frye hoped to

gain the most by letting the public hear his partisan views and assail
ed the treaty vehemently.
His attack was composed of generalizations.

At

one point, he

intimated that Senator Payne of Ohio was "unpatriotic" because he de
fended the treaty.

This slur was applauded by the gallery and spurred

on by this support of his chauvinistic oratory, he continued to ex
coriate the treaty .^

Some Senators, Frye argued, were threatening to

place fish on the free list if the Senate failed to accept the treaty.
This action he would "deplore" and pleaded with the Senate not to be
duped by British diplomacy as it had been so many times previously
The intensity of Frye's vehemence was partially caused by Senator
Payne's insinuation that Frye might be playing politics with his
opposition to commissioner Putnam.

Frye, apparently, hurt by this

accusation answered Payne by explaining his relationship with Putnam.
"I have only to say further about % . Putnam that
he is an honest man, a good lawyer, and the bemocratic
candidate for governor of Maine. I am sorry for him
that he is going to be beaten, and that this issue
will do as much to that end as anything else."97
Frye's opposition to Putnam undoubtedly influenced his position in
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regard to the treaty.

One can be sure that the Republican Party could

ill afford a Democratic victory in the "portentous” September election
in Maine .^
Frye continued his diatribe by laboriously attacking the treaty's
provisions one by one.

In each case he decided that the United States

had gained nothing that she did not have before and that the British
had conceded what "no civilized nation on the face of the earth would
deny to the vessels of ary nation in d i s t r e s s . T h e

climax of the

Maine Senator's remarks rested on emphasizing that Canadian newspapers

100
favored the treaty.

The implication was that if the journals support

ed the treaty it meant that the United States must have received "the
short end of the deal."

Later research has proved that the Canadian

press was equally divided, the conservative newspapers supported the
treaty while the liberal press opposed it.'*'0 '1' Frye, obviously, was
citing the conservative newspapers rather than the liberal, thus dis
torting the truth in order to re-inforce his own position.

Frye con

cluded that the treaty was "a dishonorable, humiliating, and cowardly
102
surrender."
The Senate debate was intermittent during the ensuing weeks.

Re-

;93. The Maine press seemed to favor Frye's position in regards
Putnam. The Bangor Whig and Courier attacked Putnam as "Cleveland1s
negotiator." See, August 11, l 898.~ Also, "we know what we want and
if he /Putnam/ thinks he can fool us he is mistaken." Ibid., Aug. 22,
1888.
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marks by Frye and his colleagues were accepted by New Englanders as
true, although comments from other sections were not complimentary.
E.L. Godkin in the Nation criticized Frye for his recklessness and
generalizations and depicted Frye's speech as being a "boisterous
arraignment" of this treaty and all previous fisheries treaties.
On August 9, 1888, Senator Morgan took the floor in an effort to
save the treaty for the administration.

During his remarks, he accused

Frye of perpetuating "a mess" for a paltry sum of money as would be
derived from an increase in the t a r i f f . H e

charged that Frye wished

for political union with Canada and that the only difficulty standing
in the way of this desire was the fact that Canada would have the same
tariff as would the United States.
industry.

This would hurt the Maine fishing

The frustrated Morgan then assailed Frye and the fishing

interests of New England.

He saids

"Whose market is it? The market of the halibut
ring, the fisherman's association, the combine who
use it for their own purposes, not the market of
the American fishermen.... All of these complaints,
now for seventy years, have come from one fishing
interest in this country...that of New England."105
Morgan reminded Frye that there were many more fishermen in the
South and in the interior who were not complaining and that the New
England fishing industry had received bounties and subsidies and still
it diminished in size.

Such reasoning was to no avail; on August 21,
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1888, the Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty was defeated by a -vote of yeas ■1 r\ /L

twenty-seven, nays - thirty, absent - nineteen.
Historians have charged that the treaty opponents acted with
partisan intent.

Frye, with the possibility of Blaine's election in

1888, the Putnam candidacy for governor of the State of Maine, and his
natural anti-Democratic philosophy was incapable of acting differently
than he did.

As an Anglophobe because of British attitudes during the

Civil War, he could not consider Great Britain in any other light than
an opportunistic, greedy, and selfish country.
With the treaty's defeat the nodus vivendi agreed upon earlier be
came e f f e c t i v e . N e g o t i a t i o n s continued between 1888 and

1911

when

a general reciprocity settlement was finally concluded only to be re
jected by the Canadian parliament.

Finally, in 1912, by the virtue of

a Hague award, the question was solved to the satisfaction of both
parties.
Actually, Secretary of State John Hay in 1900, attempted to
settle the question and received the approval of Senator Lodge and
Frye.

°

This would seem to indicate that either Frye had acted

partisanly in 1888 or he had reversed his position regards to Great
Britain.

Both were true.

Frye admitted his pleasure at Great Brit

ain's support of United States' foreign policy during the Spanish-Amer
ican War and after.

Even as early as Cleveland's second administration,

(1392-1396), Frye cooperated with the State Department and Richard
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Olnoy the Secretary of State when the latter was in need of help to
settle the Pribilof Islands seal controversy.

109

In summation, it should not be forgotten that Frye's opposition
to the Mills bill (a democratic low tariff measure which passed the
House in the summer of
eries question.

1888)

was inextricably involved with the fish

Frye was unable to oppose one and support the other

and remain consistent in his beliefs.

109.
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Chapter III
THE TARIFF AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
Senator Frye's position on tho tariff question is discerned from
the discussion of the Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations.

Frye was a

high protectionist and consistently followed this position until his
death.
During the latter half of the nineteenth century Republicans and
some Democrats believed in tho necessity of maintaining a high tariff
to protect the industrial interests.
considered inadequate.

A tariff for revenue only was

It was their belief that prosperity for all

economic interests depended on protection for a few; any other policy
would place the -American nation in a precarious industrial position in
relation to Great Britain and the continent.
should not leave the country.

They reasoned that money

A country should have more exports than

imports and the revival of a strong merchant marine was essential for
the growth of foreign commerce.
Frye was a zealous advocate of these policies.

Shortly after he

had replaced Blaine as Senator, Congress was seriously considering the
question of a tariff revision downward.

Majority opinion held that a

commission should be appointed to study the question and to recommend
changes to Congress.

This was done.

But because the commission was

composed of protectionists, the final result was only a reduction of
about five per cent.
In the discussion prior to the appointment of the commission,

1.

Harold Faulkner, Economic History of the United States, (New Tork:
McMillan Co., 195k), p. 5$0.

Ui

Frye was at his protectionist best.

Although in favor of a commission

because, "he recognized that our tariff laws must be just and equitable,

2
and the existing law does not in all respects answer this demand;"
h® made his position on the tariff clear.
"I am a protectionist from principle. If there
was no public debt, no interest to pay, no pension
list, no arny and no navy to support, I still should
oppose free trade ... and tariff for revenue only....
What are free trade and a tariff for revenue only?
They are one and the same, now and forever as in
separable as Siamese twins."3
Following this declaration of principle, Frye denounced the per
petrators of what he thought was an unsound tariff policy: "The only
prominent champions of free trade to-day in the world are England and
the Democratic Party of the United States.
Frye was not being facetious or "politiking" when he made these
statements.

He maintained persistently until his death that Great

Britain was America's most dangerous competitor, economically and mil
itarily.

Dike many of his colleagues, he twisted the lion's tail when

ever the opportunity offered, as in the Bayard-Chamberlain negotiations.
Probably no man in the United States believed in the tariff as a
panacea for the economic ills more than did Frye.

Continuously,

throughout his career, he gave speech upon speech exalting the tariff
and each followed essentially the reasoning contained in his Senate
speech supporting the commission:

2.
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"...we grow rich and powerful under protection,
and yet we have free trade more absolute and
abundant than all the rest of the world, between
the thirty-eight states and nine territories.,,
protection has invariably brought us prosperity,
increased wages, decreased cost of manufacturers,
and furnished a ready market for our farmers.
As has already been seen, Frye's desire for a high tariff on fish
from Canada helped to secure the defeat of the fisheries treaty.

Pres

ident Cleveland had wanted a lower tariff to encourage freer trade and
to remove indirect government support of manufacturing which, he felt,
had been a detriment to other elements of the cconony.

In his annual

message to Congress in December 1887, he recommended wholesale tariff
reductions.

Frye vehemently opposed this message because of its

"suicidal" possibilities to American prosperity.

6

However, the fact

that this proposal by Cleveland was contemporary to the heated BayardChamberlain negotiations should not be overlooked.
For a number of years a treasury surplus had been accumulating.
Cleveland felt that this surplus could most easily be reduced by a
tariff reduction, particularly, since, according to the President, the
tariff was "strangling" competition and increasing the wealth of only a
protected few, namely, the Captains of Industry.
Cleveland had defined the issue and the presidential election of
1888 was fought over it.

Republicans interpreted the measure, for

political reasons, as a free trade document and Frye was no exception.
On January 23,

1888,

at the height of the fisheries controversy, Frye

5.

Ibid.

6.

Lewiston Journal. December 26, 1887, p. 2.

1*3

assailed the message as "a free trade document pure and simple."7
Reading from English newspapers that were in favor of the message, he
declared that the English were trying to invade the home market of the
United States.

.After giving a list of often cited statistics showing

how prosperous America had becomo under a protective tariff, he pro
ceeded to offer his remedy for the surplus.
ternal revenue taxes.

"He would repeal all in

If that proved to be too much then taxes on

liquors and tobacco could be repealed along with the duty on sugar."®
This last proposal would appear rather conspicuous if it had been in
cluded in one of Frye's many temperance speeches; however, all crusades
are easily forgotten when danger strikes at the roots of one's secu
rity, in this case, the tariff.

A reduction of the tax on liquors would

certainly not make the price of that commodity ary higher for those who
bought it and would, no doubt,enable those who found liquor too ex
pensive with a tax on it to buy it when the tax was removed.

This

formula for reducing the surplus was inconsistent, also, with a speech
delivered October 19, 1887, at the Boston Home Market Club.

Frye had

just returned from Europe and his speech was based on observations
made while there.

Warning the group of the evils of free trade he

said:
"Are you going to allow men who call themselves
reformers, men who pretend to believe in free trade an utter absurdity, no nation believes in it - are you
going to allow them to strike at your home market? — Within the last 20 years, we have progressed marvelously
under our tariff. It was forced upon us by the war. It
was one of the most beneficient things that the war achieved
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hk
for us.
ground?

Why should we give up this vantage
Why should we trifle with it?"9

In this same speech, instead of mentioning tobacco and liquor
taxes, he advocated a different method for dispersing the surplus.
Essentially he proposed that ten million dollars a year be granted in
subsidies to American shipbuilders and owners, ten million to educate
people, and he advocated putting
Nicaraguan Canal .'*'0

500,000

men to work digging the

This change of position indicated that Frye was

not favorable to a reduction of the surplus by reducing revenues, but
rather by expending revenues on public and private projects.

It would

seem logical that Frye should recommend, as in January, a reduction of
the tax on liquor and tobacco or he should not have mentioned liquor
or tobacco since this position was not shared by the Republican Party.
The speech caused E.L. Godkin of the Nation to pounce on Frye with his
usual pungency by declaring that Frye "did not care where the surplus
was expended as long as a tariff was maintained."^
Aided by Cleveland's message, the Democrats in the House managed
to pass the Mill's Bill which contained the substance of Cleveland's
proposals.

Not to be out done, the Republican Senate, in the heat of

the Presidential campaign, proposed a substitute bill which was highly
protectionist.

Simultaneously, the heated controversy over the fisher

ies question confused issues so that the conferees from the House and
Senate could not agree on a compromise tariff.

A s a result, the tariff

9.
Albert Clark, The Tariff Made Plain, "What Senator Frye Saw in
Europe," (Boston: 1906), p. 30-36.
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proposals of both parties were thrown to the electorate for a decision
in the presidential election of

12

1888.

Benjamin Harrison emerged the winner in the election.

The Re

publican Party quickly interpreted the results as a mandate for their
policies including a high protective tariff.
received a plurality of the popular vote.

Actually Cleveland had

Any mandate based on such

an incongruity, therefore, was bound to spell trouble for those who
blindly and hopefully read in the results of the election that the
people were in agreement with their policies.
Meanwhile, James G. Blaine had become Secretary of State for
President Harrison.

Blaine had been a protectionist whenever such a

policy served his best interests as a politician.

Frye sponsored
13

Blaine's bill which proposed a meeting of a Pan-American Congress.
The bill passed and Blaine duly invited the South American republics
to a meeting to be held in Washington.

Paradoxically, Blaine's pur

pose in calling such a conference was to arrange favorable trade re
lations among Pan-American countries through tariff revisions.
The delegates to the Congress representing eighteen nations con
vened in Washington in October of 1889, and were immediately taken on a
6,000 mile junket throughout the East and Middle West.

Finally they

again assembled in Washington to resume deliberations.

Unfortunately,

Frye publicized his views on the purpose of the conference.

The Hew

York Times reported Frye's comments and sardonically editorialized:
"Mr. Frye avows that the main object was to get
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them /the delegates/here and to take them about
the country with a view to impressing them with
the greatness of its resources and its power as a
nation, as a means of commanding respect. 'This,'
he thinks, 'might have a practical result in teach
ing them to look to this country as an arbitrator
in their national disputes.'
He thinks, also, that
the congress may lead to the adoption of a common
silver coin to the profit of our Western silver
mines. Beyond that he does not expect much...
If there was an /sic7 sincerity in Secretary
Blaine's address of welcome to the delegates..„
he could not have been privy to Senator F rye's
little game."Id
The editorial made additional comments on Frye's inconsistencies
in advocating trade with South American countries and also, demanding
the high protective tariff.

It suggested, sarcastically, that Frye

might ask Congress to subsidize steamships to carry American manufac
tured goods to Latin American countries and thus solve the problem of
an adequate merchant marine by "robbing Peter to pay Paul."

The

editorial summarized its feelings toward Frye by ridiculing his
position:
"The whole thing is a tough of inconsistencies
and absurdities, and we may as well make up our
minds either to remove the barriers to foreign
trade or go without it. Putting up barriers and
trying to force trade over them is about as sensible
as building a fence for the mere purpose of climbing
over it."1-*
Even, if as '■'rye suggested, the conference had been motivated by
economic greed, it apparently was not successful.

Besides a provision

for settling disputes by arbitration, proposals for an intercontinental
railroad, customs unions, and an international American bank were

1)4.

N.Y.T.. Nov. 16, 1889, p. It.
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hi
offered.

However, Canada was not invited and her absence made it im

possible to conduct discussions relating to trade arrangements, osten
sibly the main reason for calling the Congress to Washington.

There

fore, the Congress adjourned with little likelihood that any of its
16
provisions would be implemented.
Secretary Blaine tried desperately in the ensuing months to obtain
favorable support for his reciprocity ideas.

He w as unable to under

stand why Congress allowed only $68,000,000 or eight per cent of United
States' exports to go to Latin American countries while importing
$170 ,000,000 worth of goods from those same nations.

17

The chief in

strument for securing a more favorable balance of trade with these
countries was the duty on sugar.

Republican Senators wanted to abolish

this duty and thereby lower the treasury surplus.

Such a measure would

aid the consumer because nine-tenths of the sugar used in this country
was imported from Cuba, Hawaii, and the Latin American countries.

18

Blaine, however, saw a splendid opportunity for exacting trade con
cessions on a reciprocal basis using sugar as a lure.

Accordingly, he

got Eugene Hale, Frye's colleague from Maine, to offer an amendment to
the pending McKinley tariff bill which would effectuate his plan.

19

On July 11, 1890, he expressed his opinions in an open letter to Frye,
who was a member of the Senate Finance Committee.
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"Here is an opportunity where the farmer may
be benefited.... Here is an opportunity for a
Republican Congress to open the markets of forty
millions of people to the products of American
farms. Shall we seize the opportunity or shall
we throw it away? -- there_is not a section or
a line in the entire bill /McKinley Tariff Bill/
that will open the market for another bushel of
wheat or another barrel of pork."20
Blaine wrote a similar letter to the major of Augusta, Maine, and
July 26, 1890, he wrote again to Frye expressing the same sentiments.
These letters received nation-wide publicity.

Unfortunately, Blaine's

proposal was defeated largely because the protectionist Congress feared
that any such arrangement would have to include Canada.

Canada was

feared as an economic competitor which might ruin the American econony
if her goods were allowed to compete with American goods.

Thus ended

an intelligent, equitable, and sound proposal buried by the McKinley
Tariff of 1390, a tariff for which Frye v o t e d . ^
Frye's tariff ideas were well known by 1890.

He always supported

a high tariff, but was never,personally, a potent force for enacting
the tariffs.
Tariff.

In I 89U, he voted against the Democratic Milson-Oorman

In 1897, he voted for the Republican Dingley Tariff.

He fail

ed to see that the home market was diminishing as the industrial output
increased.

He always advocated a tariff higher than the prevailing one

hoping to capture the remaining few areas of the home market.

He did

not understand that unless the United States imported, she could not
export.
After the passage of the Democratic, but still protectionist

20.
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due to crippling amendments, Wilson-Gorman Tariff of I 89U, Frye gave a
speech at Bridgeport, Connecticut, in which he analyzed the depressed
economic conditions of the country and offered his remedies.
"Just as soon as we get the chance we /^Republican
Party/7, will revise the tariff, and on old lines too.
We shall admit free of duty all we need and can't
produce here, other than luxuries. On everything
made in Europe that competes with American labor a
duly will be placed equal to the difference between
wages here and there. It will be framed on the
lines of the McKinley Bill, the best tariff measure
ever enacted."22
Frye also claimed that Thomas B. Reed had more to do with the
bill's passage than McKinley.

This caused one paper to note the basic

economic fallacies contained in Frye's address and that he was hurting
Reed's chances for the Presidency in

1896

by attaching his name to the

abominable tariff of 1890.
"We have too much respect for Mr. Reed to suppose
that he is not thoroughly nauseated by it. If Frye
continues this kind of oratory, Mr. Reed's chances,
for a Republican nomination will promptly vanish. t»23
In November of 1895, Frye delivered a similar tariff speech at
Biddleford, Maine.
"We propose to run this government on the receipts
of a protective tariff. Congress may be obliged to
touch the tariff but it will do so as lightly as
possible for when tariff revision takes place it must
be done under the Administration of a party in full
.
sympathy with the protection of American industries."2^
To the writer it appears that the tariff had made Frye a
monomaniac.

Every action, every move depended first on how it would
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affect the tariff.
government in l894 .

The Democrats had control of all branches of the
However, there were enough protectionist Democrats,

if they voted an bloc with the Republicans, to stop any appreciable
reduction in the tariff.

The R epublicans gained control again in 1896

and in the following year passed the Dingley Tariff which imposed the
highest duties of any tariff to that date.

Frye backed this revision

and since Dingley was also from F rye's home city of Lewiston, he
probably did considerable coaching of Mr. Dingley.
It is difficult, if not futile, to understand the logic of Frye's
position on the tariff.

He would faithfully vote for a high tariff

and simultaneously lament the decline of the merchant marine.

One

source commented on this paradox by calling attention to the fact that
"Senator Frye's party has for years devoted two-thirds of its dynamic
energy and substantially all of its campaign money to the attempt to
prohibit and destroy commerce.

Dingleyism and extension are incom-

25
patible..."

-Apparently Messers. Dingley and Frye did not share that

opinion.
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Chapter IV
THE MERCHANT MARINE
The growth of the United States' merchant marine had been continu
ous until the Civil War.

The era of the forties and fifties had seen

clipper ships and packets in almost every part of the world.

However,

circumstances during and after the war caused the merchant marine fleet
to disintegrate until in 1900 the American merchant marine carried only
8.7 per cent of United States' foreign commerce.
There are numerous reasons for this collapse.

Great Britain had

greatly exceeded American progress in the development of her steel and
iron industry.

When tho revolution from wooden to iron ships was tak

ing place in the 1850's and 1860's, she produced steel ships more
cheaply than did American shipbuilders.

Therefore, she carried the

world's commerce with a distinct advantage over American wooden vessels.
Another serious blow to the merchant marine was a law enacted by
Congress in 1866, which stated that "no American vessel that had been
transferred to foreign registry during the Civil War should be re
admitted to American registry."^

Since American shipowners, wishing to

save their vessels from Southern raiders, had sold one-third of the
American merchant fleet during the war to foreign countries, one-third
of the carrying fleet was eliminated.
Professor Zeis, who has written a definitive account of American
shipping policy, feels that the most important single cause for the de
cline was the maintenance of navigation laws which restricted American

1. Paul Zeis, American Shipping Policy, (Princeton: Princeton Univ
ersity Press, 193*U, p. 15.

>2

52
registry to ships built in the United States and owned by American
citizens living in the United States.

2

These laws prohibited the pur

chasing of foreign ships for use in the carrying trade.

Since Great

Britain was building ships at less cost than the United States and
since American shipowners could not purchase these cheaper foreign
built ships, the inevitable occurred.

This situation seriously im

perilled two of New England's most lucrative activities, shipbuilding
and commerce.

Therefore, it was not surprising to see as early as

l8?0, Representative lynch of Maine trying to reverse this disastrous
trend.
Lynch introduced a bill to provide large bounties to shipbuilders
but only token bounties to shipowners.

It did not pass the House but

was important not only for the interest shown in the decline of the
merchant marine, but, also, because it marked the genesis of the battle
between those who opposed "free ships" and those who advocated generous
government subsidies to the shipping industry.

In general, the "free

shippers" wanted the navigation laws repealed so that American ship
owners could purchase cheaper foreign vessels.

The opponents of the

"free shippers" obviously echoed the pressures exerted by the ship
builders whose position would be jeopardized permanently if cheaper
foreign vessels could be bought.
For New England, the ideal program would have been one not only
requiring American shipowners to buy their ships from native builders,
but also, one which allowed the American fleet to compete with English

2.

Ibid., p. 15.

3.

Ibid., p . 19
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ships in the foreign carrying trade.

This could only be done by grant

ing bounties or subsidies.
While James G. Blaine served as Senator from Maine, he had intro
duced bills to aid A m erican shipping but these failed.^*

Frye assumed

the mantle when he entered the Senate and for twenty-five years tried
as futilely as his predecessor to solve the problems of the Maine
shipbuilder.
Nelson Dingley was serving as a Representative from Maine's sec
ond district much of the time while Frye was in the Senate.

Since the

second district included Bath the home of the Sewall Shipbuilding Com
pany, Dingley allied himself with Frye to halt attempts made to allow
"free ships" in the early 1380's,^

On January

6,

1383, in a speech on

a "free ship" bill, Dingley declared "no policy ... that looks to mak
ing this nation dependent upon a foreign nation, upon a nation like
England, for the supply of vessels to carry on its merchant marine can
be wise and safe."^

Upholding the navigation laws which prohibited

"free ships", Dingley explained that in time of war it would be man
datory to have a merchant fleet "of our own” .

Three dqys later,

Dingley introduced a bill to aid the merchant fleet and to encourage
shipbuilding by the awarding of mail subsidy contracts.
duced the bill in the Senate where it was adopted.

Frye intro

In the House it

7
encountered violent opposition and was subsequently killed.*
5
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In 1886, another attempt was made by Dingley during the fisheries
controversy.

It was the Dingley Shipping Bill to which Frye attached a

rider calling for retaliatory legislation against Canadian discriminaQ
tion.
Frye wished to build up the American fishing fleet and thus
stimulate the faltering shipbuilding industry.
With the advent of Harrison's administration circumstances changed
somewhat.

Blaine became Secretary of State again and lost no time im

plementing his belief that a South American trade was possible through
the use of reciprical trade agreements and subsidies to steamship lines.
Although his tariff ideas were repudiated, the movement for subsidiza
tion gained momentum and in 1891, the Frye-Farguhar bill passed.
The reader will recall that Frye's solution for the treasury sur
plus in 1887 contained an appropriation of $10,OCX),000 for ship sub
sidies.

In the 5lst Congress, he introduced several bills which would

have relieved the burden on the merchant marine by exempting vessels
from taxation,while paying a subsidy to shipbuilders.

The most im

portant bills, if for no other reason than that they passed, were ones
providing

30

cents a mile a ton for slow vessels built in the United
9

States with American registry.

To placate the owners of fast liners,

Frye introduced another bill providing for four classes of subsidized
steamers with payments ranging as high as six dollars a mile for first
class liners to one dollar a mile for fourth class steamers.
Frye's purpose in these bills was simply to revive the merchant
marine and benefit Maine shipbuilding.

8.

Ibid. , p. 269.

9.
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His position on "free ships"8
9

Sess., p. 6907.
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precluded any other solution except subsidies.

Frye maintained that

the only trouble with the merchant marine was its lack of tariff pro
tection.

"Why should we pay $15,000,000 a year to foreign built ships

for carrying our cargoes ?"101
3 When he visited Europe in the spring of
2

„

1887, he had not seen one American vessel in an' European port.
was bothered by the American neglect of her merchant marine.

11

Frye

With

Dingley, he argued that in war time it would be necessary to have a
native fleet which could be depended on.

In addition, he must have

hoped that the shipbuilding industry would revive so that Maine could
be restored to her rightful place among the more prosperous states of
the Union.
Frye persistently fought for subsidies but such men as Senator
Vest of Missouri reminded the Senate periodically that Frye represented
"a shipping people".

"Take away the shipbuilding from Maine and

•Othello’s occupation is gone'.

A.s a matter of course, if this bill is

passed it is better than a gold mine in Maine."
difficult to deny.

12

Such assertions were

However, Maine was a sizeable distance from the

supplies of steel and iron, and probably would have been at a disad
vantage with Massachusetts, New York, or Pennsylvania.

Nevertheless,

on July 12, 1890, the Senate passed Frye's bill by a vote of 28 to 16
with

,

4O

absences.

13

In the House Frye's program guided by Repre sentative F arguhar was
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overwhelmingly defeated by an aroused opposition led by Joe Cannon.1**
The tonnage bill considered more iniquitous of the two was killed.

The

postal subsidy bill likewise was attacked and, although passing, was
emasculated by cutting the payments by one-third.

The Senate accepted

the amended bill and it was enacted as the Postal Aid Law of March 3,
1891 . 15

|

The law divided mail-carrying steamships into four classes.

The

fastest, at least twenty knots, would carry mails between the United
|
'
States and Great Britain. The second class, at least sixteen knots,
would carry mails between South America and the United States.

|

The

third and fourth classes were granted mail delivery with the North
American continent.

The first and fastest class of ships would receive

four dollars per mile for an outward voyage.

The remaining three

classes would receive two dollars, one dollar, and sixty-six and two-

16
thirds cents respectively.
Originally, Frye had expected that entirely new lines would be
formed and new ships would be built.

While these vessels carried the

mail, they could also carry other goods at rates comparable to those
charged by competing nations, namely, Great Britain and Spain, since
the subsidy would compensate for the difference in cost.

This, pre-

sumably, would increase the American merchant fleet so that in a few
short years the country would be the proud possessor of a large fleet
_____________________
i
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of first line steamships.

One authority believes, as does the pr esent

writer, that this estimate would have been realized if Frye's proposal
had been allowed to pass in its original form.

17

Except for two foreign built ships and two American built ships,
the Saint Paul and the Saint L ouis, Frye's expectations failed to
materialize.
Line.

The only new line that was established was the American

When the act expired in 1923, only eight lines were in opera-

tion and without a postal subsidy they could have continued.
Frye foresaw that the bill as passed would not suffice.

18
Both he

and Senator Hale voted against the acceptance of the House amendment
but to no avail.

Frye, on the day of the vote, pleaded that a revived

merchant marine was an absolute necessity, if for no

other reason

than the vessels could be used as naval auxiliaries.

Actually, the

net result of the Postal Act of 1891, can be measured by the fact that
the four new ships which were engaged in carrying mails were converted
to warships during the Spanish-American War aid proved to be invaluable
additions to the American flotilla.

20

Throughout the 1890's and early 1900's, the clamor for ships was
continued by such bold advocates as Admiral Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt,
and Senator Lodge.

Frye, their close friend, introduced bills and

more bills to aid American shipping but without success.

From 1892 to

1912, every platform of the Republican party contained a plank ad-1
7
*
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vocating aid to the struggling merchant fleet.

However, it was the

methods of implementation on which proponents were attacked and de
feated, not the principle in general.
In 1897, Frye organized a committee to promote an intense cam
paign to expand the foreign trade fleet as an instrument o f national
defense.

This group consisted of many prominent and influential

people interested in aid to shipping and aid to themselves or their
vested interests.

Some of its leading members were: Senators Hanna,

Perkins, Frye, and Elkins; Representative Payne of Ohio; Charles H.
Cramp, the well known Philadelphia shipbuilder; Edwin Hyde, president
of the Bath, Maine Shipbuilding Company; C,&. Griscom, president of
the American Line; Theodore Search, president of the National Associ
ation of Manufacturers; and Joseph P, Grace, of the famous Grace

rL i n e s . 21
This committee met continuously for three years in N ew York,
Philadelphia, and Washington.

It was impossible, inspite of Frye's

contention that the only interests considered were the interests of
the American people,

22

for this group not to be partial, although

evidence of a great deal of compromise is confirmed in the report of
the committee given by Frye to the Senate on December

h, 1900.

In

stead of discriminating duties, tonnage taxes or bounties as might be
expected from such a group, the report recommended sailing bounties
i.e., bounties paid on tonnage of ships and miles traveled.

Frye re

ported that none of the committee was in favor of "free ships" nor 2
1
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could he understand why they should b e . ^
This report of the committee was re-drafted and presented to the
Senate, in substantially the same language, as the Hanna-Payne bill of

1899.

It was defeated and in

1900,

Frye introduced it again.

Frye's

bill would have provided a general bounty of one and one-half cents a
gross ton per hundred miles for the first 1,500 miles.

Beyond 1,$00

miles, the bounty was to be reduced to one cent for each one hundred
miles.

The total amount to be expended in one year could not exceed

$9,000,000.

Frye had set this limit hoping it would facilitate the

bill's passage.

2ll

Unfortunately for Frye, Senators Vest and Clay completely ana
lyzed the bill and pointed out its defects to the Senate.

They ascer

tained that the major portions of the bounty payments would go to
large companies such as the Standard Oil which were: already making a
profit.

Another devasting point was that no new ships could be built

because those in the process of being built would absorb two million
dollars beyond the nine million dollar limitation suggested by Frye.
If the ceiling were lifted there was no telling what the cost to the
taxpayer would be.

Th 6 bill never came to a vote due to the efforts

of Vest and Clay who convinced enough Senators that Frye was not the
great and patriotic -American that one national magazine had described
26
in a recent article.2
3
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In his second inaugural address, President McKinley, no doubt at
the insistence of his friend Mark Hanna, had ’urged that something be
done for-American shipping.

Complying with McKinley's sense of urgen

cy, Frye re-introduced in December 1901, the same bill as in 1900 ex
cluding the nine million dollar limit for bounty payments.

This was a

"last ditch" attempt to get an aid working program established.

The

culmination of eighteen years of work and thought went into the bill
and the culmination of eighteen years of ill-will defeated the bill.
The nine million dollar limit was restored on the Senate bill which
passed but in the House the proposal failed to survive the Committee
on Commerce and was defeated.

Apparently the American people, hav

ing their fill of government subsidies like the railroad grants, were
not impressed by the chauvinistic utterances of Frye and his supporters
It is not difficult to d iscern a major reason why Frye's plans
passed the Senate but were rejected by the hostile House.

Hndeniably

the House, being popularly elected, was a more reliable reflector of
public opinion.

The Senate had become an aristocratic institution rep

resenting the nouveau riche, as one can readily see by reading David
Graham Phillips' exposures.

The -Hewiston Senator associated with men

of wealth and could not help but be influenced by them.

Eugene Hale,

Nelson Aldrich, and Mark Hanna, three of his closest friends were
multimillionaires and were not noted for their records of public
service.

Quite naturally associations such as these, would bring cries

of special privilege from many people.
Such impressions were underscored when Frye accepted an invitation 2
7
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from the commercial, steamship, and other allied groups of the City of
New Xork to attend a huge testimonial dinner to be held in his honor
at the Waldolf-Astoria April 26, 1899.

The banquet was a "token of

thanks from New Xork City to Frye for his indefatigable promotion of
American commerce, particularly, for the huge appropriation Frye had
obtained for the improvement of New Y ork's harbor facilities.

As

Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, he had for years cham
pioned "pork barrel" legislation in an attempt to improve the river
and harbor facilities of the country, and thereby improve the status
of the American merchant marine.
The dinner was an impressive affair.

One newspaper described the

ballroom decorations:
"The favors and designs of the evening were
appropriate. The sherbet boxes were miniature
channel dredges, and with the ice cream the regi
ment of waiters carried in designs of ocean steam
ships, steamdredges, and cornucopias. A chart of
New Xork harbor was placed at every place.
Among the guests were Governor Theodore Roosevelt who acted as
chairman; Senators Platt, Cutting, Depew, and many of the most prom
inent representatives of New Y ork's commercial interests.
Governor Roosevelt opened the banquet reading a letter from
President McKinley commending Frye's devotion to the commercial and
industrial interests of the country.

Senator Platt seconded the

commendation and added, "if there is a senator now in public life who
I
2
8
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can be said to belong to us all, he is Hie Honorable William P. *rye
of the State of Maine."
from New fork.

Next to speak was Mr. Ambrose, state senator

He described Frye's cooperation when he (Ambrose) went

to the Commerce Committee to ask for an appropriation for New York
harbor.

Frye pushed the bill through the Senate, related Ambrose, and

when the House balked, Frye was appointed as one of the Senate con
ferees to meet with House conferees to iron out their differences.
Ambrose then described Frye's patience and understanding in listening
to the "long-winded conferees" and after hearing the House proposals,
he then replied "with a ringing declaration in favor of the New York
measure and the House conferees were forced to yield to his logic."
After Ambrose's speech, Governor Roosevelt then introduced Frye
who was the guest of honor and the main speaker of the evening.
began with the traditional after-dinner joke.

Frye

The New York Times'

correspondent reported this portion of his speech where Frye had an
occassion to use the word "damn".

"This sent a shiver throughout the

galleries which were crowded with women, but the point of the story was
caught immediately by all and was applauded by the fair hands in the
gallery."

The main portion of the speech concerned itself with the

usual topics, the tariff, commerce, merchant marine, expansion, and
how to promote them.

He offered no new ideas but simply reiterated

old ones and those of his party.

He did point to the United States'

unpreparedness for the Spanish-American War and blamed government
neglect of the merchant marine for a good part of this unpreparedness.
This probably was the only indisputable statement made that night.
Maine Republican newspapers rejoiced at seeing one of Maine's

63
native sons feted by such important men .^9

The Mew York Times, how

ever, criticized Frye and "his class" with their ideas and methods and
voiced the opinion that such ideas and methods were giving way to
others of a "broader view and a firmer grip on the facts of international trade."

30

The dinner itself was described in the New York press in column
headlines.

Some of the guests must have been uneasy,however.

Senator

Platt praised Governor Roosevelt whom, in less than a year, he was to
"push" into the Vice-Presidency so that he would be eliminated from
New York state politics.

Platt and Frye exchanged verbal platitudes

when memories of the bitter 1880 Republican convention, when Conkling
and Platt humiliated Frye, must have been revived.

Many who read the

accounts of this affair must have had their beliefs confirmed, partic
ularly, those who felt that this type of "honoring" was an example of
what America held most sacred.
In all probability, this public association with the industrial
magnates alienated the agrarian and reform elements of late nineteenth
century America from supporting the merchant marine.

They had had

unpleasant experiences with railroad subsidies and found that the
benefits of such government aid without government regulations was
extremely limited.

Such affairs as the Waldolf banquet were common

place in that period and such names as Samuel Gompers, Robert La
Follette, or Eugene Debs were conspicuous by their absence.

29. Bangor Daily Commercial, April 28, 1899.
other' Maine dailies.
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Delmonico's famed New York restaurant saw many testimonial
dinners.

From such celebrities as Herbert Spencer and Henry Ward

Beecher, to men like Chauncey Depew, Frye, and Charles Cramp often
attended dinners in honor of the "successful individualist" in these
years.

The latter group met at Delmonico's in December 1895, to

celebrate the centennial observance of Jay's Treaty.

Frye spoke in

the presence of Charles Cramp, the Philadelphia shipbuilder, pleading
for discriminatory duties and taxes to lift the merchant marine "out

31
of the depths of adversity."

Perhaps a similar address at a grange

meeting or an A.F.L. local gathering would have been more effective in
the final realization of his plans.
From 1902 to 1910, Frye introduced more subsidy legislation but
such proposals seldom survived the committees of the House.

The

hostile, liberal press gave the public the impression that subsidies
were raids on the treasury,
the shipbuilders.

32

and that Frye was the personal lobby for

One of the last of Frye's efforts to revive the

merchant marine was contained in one of the few articles Frye wrote
for national magazines.

It appeared in the June

21,

1906 issue of the

Independent and was entitled, "The Meaning and Necessity of Ship Sub
sidies."^
In the article, Frye expressed his disgust that American owned
ships carried only six per cent of American foreign commerce.

Having

spent five million dollars on the harbor of Galveston, Texas, alone,
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and having only

one American ship that used its facilities seemed

a

huge waste.

addition, he said that in the year 1905, the only

A-

In

merican vessels to enter foreign ports were: one in France, two in
Germany, and fifty-seven in England.

If that was not bad enough, the

American consul in Finland had seen only one American ship in his fif
teen years at that post.
in this article.

Frye made one notable reversal of position

The author of the Postal Subsidy -Act of 1891, con

fessed that a postal subsidy was an aristocracy, because it resulted
in a monopoly.

"It is to be paid to but one line.

We should encourage

the building of

ships by any man who has money to build t h e m . " ^

He

had no idea how to do this and subsidies remained his only answer.
Frye died in 1911 and with him went his vision of a strong mer
chant marine.

Ironically, as a result of the impending World War, in

19ll| a Democratic administration succeeded in passing legislation which
allowed "free ships" to engage in foreign commerce, a principle that
Frye had opposed all of his life.

Subsequent legislation was passed

embodying many of Frye's ideas, however, and by

1920, Americans

could

observe that American owned, if not built, vessels registered in the
foreign trade were carrying forty-three per cent*

of American export

and import trade compared to the six per cent observed by Frye in

1906.

Frye was correct when he warned that the United States must not be
come a neutral without ships in time of war.
that these ideas were finally vindicated.

It was because of the war

Whatever the Senator's mo

tives for subsidizing the merchant marine his ideas were esseiUaDy sound.*
3
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Chapter V

FRYE AND THE RISE OF THE UNITED STATES TO A WORLD POWER
Up to now, Senator Frye has been seen as a champion of the com
mercial and industrial interests through his support of a high pro
tective tariff as well as a merchant marine.

The late 1880's found

him espousing a new idea, economic imperialism.

1

Frye was not alone

in this crusade to find new markets for the overproduced goods of the
tariff protected industrial machine of the United States.

But, only a

few men were in the position to implement this idea on the national
level, and perhaps the Senate Foreign Relations Committee offered as
much of an opportunity as could be found.
Senator ^iye had been appointed to the Committee on Foreign
Relations in 1885, largely because of Senator Hoar of Massachusetts
who was a member of that committee.

2

Frye remained a member for

twenty-six years terminating with his death in
the chairmanship of the committee in

1898,

1911 .

He was offered

but refused because he did
3

not wish to relinquish the chairmanship of the Committee on Commerce.
From this vantage point, being associated with his friend, the power
ful Henry Cabot Lodge, Frye could be very influential in foreign
affairs.
The United States embarked on the expansion trail in the
mainly because of economic considerations.

1.

1890's,

However, another important
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reason must be mentioned.

In

1890,

Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote

a book entitled, The Influence of Seapower Upon History.

It was Mahaa's

contention that to be an economically secure country, like Great Brit
ain, a nation must develop a large and powerful navy.
isted to protect commerce in time of peace and war.

Sea power ex
The navy would

keep trade routes open and protect coaling and way stations along the
trading lanes.

But America had no merchant marine to protect and had

there been any, there was only a pathetically anemic navy to protect
i ^
Frye was greatly influenced by the Admiral's thesis as were many
Americans.

However, that the writings of Mahan were the determining

factor behind Frye's expansionism can be easily refuted.

1888,

A s early as

two years before Mahan's classic, Frye showed his imperialist

hand when he became alarmed at German overtures in the Pacific archi
pelago of Samoa.

Before the Apia incident had brought the situation

to a head, Frye recommended that the United States display herrpower

5
as a country b y sending war ships to protect its interests.

Later,

as the situation became explosive, he expressed views which portented
the expansionist fervor ten years hence.

"It (Pago Pago) is the best

harbor in the Pacific Ocean, right in the hurricane latitude, and it
is absolutely necessary if we have vessels in that ocean that we can
have the right of harborage in Pago Pago - absolutely necessary 1— If the Nicaraguan Canal is built -- Samoa is of infinitely greater

li. Julius Pratt, Expansionists of
Press, 1926), pp. 1-20.
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importance to our interests than the Sandwich Islands... ."^
While this aggressive tone was more justified than in the fisher
ies controversy, Frye omitted humanitarian justification for maintain
ing American rights in Pago Pago; the economic considerations were
paramount.

Pago Pago was a coaling station and, true to Mahanism,

coaling stations were vital possessions in order to supply American
merchant vessels and the navy, however inadequate both were.
More significant than Samoa to the expansionist crusade was Amer
ican interest in Hawaii.

For decades a small group of Americans had

been steadily increasing their control over the islands until in the
1880's over two-thirds of the total taxable real estate of the Hawaiian

Islan d s was in American hands.

7

In 1875, Congress had approved a

re cip r o city treaty with Hawaii whereby sugar was allowed to come in to
the United Sta te s a t an advantage over Cuban and Louisiana sugar.

This

accelerated a boom in the isla n d s so th a t by 1890, th ree-fourths o f
Hawaiian imports came from the United S ta te s and ninety-nine per cent
o f her exports were absorbed by the United S ta t e s .

This gave Hawaii a

very favorable balance of trade re su ltin g in the accumulation o f sur
plus c a p it a l.

H aw aii's phenomenal p ro sp erity, however, depended on the
Q

United States and its favorable reciprocity arrangement.
In 1890, Frye supported the McKinley Tariff which allowed all
sugar to enter the United States free of duty and gave Louisiana sugar
growers a two cent per pound bounty.
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Hawaii was forced to compete with

69
Cuban and American grown sugar causing serious economic dislocations
in the islands as their exports nosedived.
preciated mare than $12,000,000.

Property in Hawaii de

One solution to this economic dis

aster was annexation by the United States so that Hawaii could also
receive the sugar bounty.
The allegation that American sugar interests incited the eventual
revolution in 1893 often has been voiced.

Actually opinion among the

sugar planters was sharply divided because annexation by the United
States would mean the exclusion of Oriental labor upon which the in9
dustry depended.

The real reasons, it can be safely concluded, were

due to the material benefits expected from annexation, plus the desire

10
to oust the unstable government of Queen Liluiokalani.
On January lit, 1893, the Queen promulgated a new constitution
highly unfavorable to American interests.

Anticipating the Queen's

move, her enemies had organized a revolutionary movement which had the
support of the United States Minister to Hawaii, John L. Stevens.

On

January 16, Stevens, at the request of the pro-annexationists, ordered
more than 150 armed men from the U.S.S. Boston to protect American
property in the islands, and on January 17, he recognized the revolu
tionary government which had been so weak as to need his assistance.
Two weeks later, Stevens proclaimed Hawaii a protectorate and advised
the State Department to act quickly lest Great Britain annex the is
lands.

9.
10.

Shortly thereafter, a hastily prepared treaty for annexation
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was submitted to the Senate.1-*- However, the Senate heeded Cleveland's
request for delay and took no action prior to March It,

1893.

Cleveland, after becoming President for the second time, was ex
tremely suspicious of the conduct of Minister Stevens concerning the
revolution.

Accordingly, on March 9, 1893, he withdrew the treaty

from the Senate and promptly appointed James Blount as an official
commissioner with "paramount authority" to visit the islands and in
vestigate the entire situation.
When Blount arrived in Hawaii, he proceeded to lower the -American
flag over the government house and to dismiss the military who had
been ordered ashore by Stevens.

His position repudiated, Stevens re-

signed in disgust and was succeeded by Blount.
John Stevens was a Maine man.

12

He had been co-editor of the

Kennebec Journal with James G. Blaine and followed Blaine to Washington
where the latter secured Stevens' appointment as Minister to Hawaii,in
13
1889.

Being closely connected with Blaine throughout his career,

Stevens shared Blaine's philosophy of expansion.

It is little wonder

that Cleveland's repudiation of him was taken as a repudiation of ex
pansionism in general, and Maine's pride in her public servants in
particular.
Blount's final report charged Stevens of improperly aiding the
revolution and concluded that the revolution would not have material-
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ized without his aid.l^

As if a portent of what was to come, Frye's

home-town newspaper viciously attacked Blount and his report as being
in a "league with Spreckles",

and earlier the Kennebec Journal,

true to its former editor, pronounced Blount a liar and described
l£
Stevens as a great man who also was a "true, tried and tested American'.'
It is interesting to note that while Blount's report was being dis
cussed, the Journal carried full texts of all of Stevens' addresses,
some delivered as far away as Chicago.

Stevens had been carrying on a

campaign of vindication and had addressed many pro-annexationists
groups in the East.
A New fork newspaper carried a story which alleged that Senators
Hale, Aldrich, and Frye owned Hawaiian bonds and therefore had a
monetary interest in annexation.

17

This accusation was alarming to

Frye and when the Blount report reached the Senate, Frye not only sup
ported Stevens' position by describing him as a man "of the highest
-l Q

character,"

1

but found it necessary to clear himself of any ulterior

motives for his support of Stevens.

At one stage of the debate, as if

defending himself as well as his friend Stevens, Frye vehemently denied
that Stevens would incite a revolution and protested the Democratic
assertions to that effect.

After one of Frye's remarks, Senator West
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from Missouri responded that he would sooner trust a hungry wolf "when
the bleat of a farmer's lamb is heard than Senator Frye.

With all his

generous instincts it is impossible for him to be anything else but an
intense New England Republican.

Like his friend, Mr. Stevens, his

whole political action is governed by the great truth that the earth
belongs to the saints, and we are saints."^
Apparently such verbal attacks bothered Frye little.

Shortly

afterward he accused Blount of not writing one line of "plain, untar
nished truth" in his report, and reiterated that Stevens was unquestionably innocent of any ulterior motives.

20 m
Tempers

and emotions had

become so aroused that the Kennebec Journal claimed that Frye's rather
unoriginal assessment of Blount's report would "live in history” as it
cut to the truth like a skilled surgeon.

21

On December 27, 1893, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee be
gan an investigation to ascertain whether there were irregularities in
Stevens' behavior or in Blount's report.

A subcommittee composed of

Senators Frye, Morgan, Gray and Sherman worked on the project until
late February I89i*.
points.

There was sharp disagreement on several important

Senator Morgan's report exonerated everyone except Queen

22
Lili.

The Republican members, including Frye, agreed with Morgan's

assessment of Stevens but not his conclusions concerning Blount and1
9
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President Cleveland.^3

The other Democratic Senators dissented from

Morgan's approval of Stevens' actions but approved of Blount's actions.
Apparently the subcommittee's investigation and conclusions were
simply perfunctory exercises confirming the members' preconceived
notions and prejudices.

Nothing new was revealed.

Frye and his Republican colleagues based their opposition on the
technicality that Blount's appointment without the consent of the Sen
ate was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . i n addition, they urged that the Queen
not be restored as Cleveland had previously suggested.

25

Their rec

ommendations would preserve the integrity of the provisional govern
ment and would (when the present furor subsided) leave the way open
26
for a renewal of pressure for annexation.-

This resolution never

came to a vote.
The most important question was whether or not the United States
would adopt an expansionist program.

A resolution against annexation

was introduced by Senator Vest of Missouri and was vehemently debated.
Vest who had steadfastly opposed Frye in all of the latter's projects
remained equally steadfast on this issue.

27

Frye, on the other hand,

took his usual exception to his adversary's proposal and bluntly ad
mitted that he was, "and had been always a very e m e s t annexationist
pQ
..."
Re maintained that the best interests of Hawaii and the United2
3
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Ik
States required annexation and advocated the immediate recognition of
the provisional government.
tion.

"Let the Senate pass the /Frye7 resolu

Let it be sent across this continent, across the ocean, down

into the paradise of the Pacific, and let the hearts of those confid
ing people once more be assured that they are not to be attacked by
30
the troops of their own government."
As the session progressed, debate on Hawaiian annexation became
intermittent and no general agreement seemed forthcoming.
May a breakthrough became apparent.

Late in

Senator Kyle of South Dakota in

troduced a resolution to the effect that the United States should not
use force to restore the monarchy or to maintain the provisional
government.

31

To Frye and others this proposal was preferable to the

restoration of the Queen.

He expressed the sentiments of the annex

ationists when he voted for the resolution to give the Hawaiian people
their "liberty of thought and action," but refused to vote for a reso32
lution which proposed that the United States would not annex Hawaii.
This concluded the first political airing of the expansionist philos
ophy in a

body

not yet ready to assume the responsibilities of a colo

nial empire.
Senator Frye was disappointed at the outcome of the treaty and
looked forward to the day when annexation would be consummated.

From

lS9ii to 1898, Hawaii under President Dole enjoyed a great peace and2
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prosperity due to the abolition of the Louisiana sugar bounty and a
reversion to the favorable position she enjoyed in 1890.

33

stable government was all that was desired, Hawaii had one.

If a
However,

to Frye, stability meant a relatively independent citizenry of Hawaii,
an independence which might lead that island into the hands of Great
Britain.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Frye and others would

be acutely aware of any change that would endanger American interests
in Hawaii.
Early in January 1895, a small royalist group was apprehended and
jailed by Honolulu police.

The city was placed under martial law.

However, when a sufficient amount of time had lapped, the provisional
government saw that the severe counter measures taken by them were
absurd.

The prisoners were released and the island returned to norraal0

Annexationists used the "revolt" as a further excuse to beat the drums
for annexation.

Quotidian speeches emphasizing the seriousness of the

situation were made by Frye, Lodge, and others.

At Bridgeport,

Connecticut, in March, 1895, Frye delivered a bombastic speech.

After

extolling the protective tariff and the McKinley Tariff in particular,
he added his description of the glories of late nineteenth century
Republicanism:
"Give us Republican rule for a single decade of
unlimited, uncrippled power, and we will show the
people the beneficence of Republican legislation.
We will annex the Hawaiian Islands, fortify Pearl
Harbor, build the Nicaraguan Canal and marry too
great oceans. We will show people a foreign policy
that is American in every fibre and hoist the American 3
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flag on whatever island we think best, and no
hand shall ever pull it d o w n . ^
American journalism would be veiy irresponsible if it allowed
such jingoism to go unchallenged.

One paper, a traditional foe of

Frye and Imperialism, labeled Frye the spokesman for "a few men of
feeble nerves and narrow imagination.

The Nation brought up the

embarrassing Hawaiian bond syndicate and described Frye and Senator
Lodge as going into a "corybantic rage" to denounce the allegation.

36

Frye took little note of these editorial comments and extended
his belligerency in an interview given a week later at Biddleford,
Maine.
"I would not submit to any insult, to any
aggressions on our rights.... I would annex the
Hawaiian Islands at once.... I would maintain our
coaling stations in Pago Pago against the world...
If Spain, by her actions at any time, justified us
in so doing, I would seize and hold Cuba against
the world.
I would accept Canada and would not offer her in
ducements to stay away, as this last Democratic con
gress did. It made her a present of one million
dollars annually as a bonus to remain under the pro
tection of Great Britain, to nag, insult, and abuse
us. Even if ■
‘hgland forced us into another declaration
of war, I would promptly seize Canada and make her for
ever a part of the Republic."3?
This interview caused the Nation to describe Frye as being in an
intoxicated mental condition,

while the Independent called him a*
3
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"buccaneer."39

The most bitter assailing came from the Times.

It re

ported that Frye had startled the public and also American friends
abroad.
"Not that the Senator has any great reputation
for wisdom, for he has not. But he has been con
sidered to be rather more sensitive to ridicule
than Boutelle (from Maine's third district) or
Henry Cabot Lodge. This goes far beyond the con
ventional and platitudinous Frye. It out Boutelles
Boutelle and out Lodges Lodge.... Lodge in. his
wildest moments never went as far as this ."*10
In the same article the Times compared the growing imperialistic
sentiment with the Salem witchcraft hysteria and concluded, facetiously,
that Frye had lost his mind.

"Such talk from a man in Senator Frye's

position tends to make the United States odius and ridiculous before
the world.
Much of the criticism of Frye had been accentuated by his reso
lution introduced during the height of the "royalist threat" in Hawaii,
Appealing to the emotions of his colleagues, he had demanded that w a r 
ships be sent to Hawaii to protect American life and property and to
prevent the restoration of Queen L i l i . ^

This would, of course, vio

late the Vest resolution for which he voted, the resolution saying
that the United States would not aid either the royalists or the pro
visional government of Hawaii with arms.

Although the proposal was

loudly denounced by the majority of the Senate, Fjye persisted, and
finally accused President Cleveland and Secretary of State Gresham of3
9
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being friendly to the Queen and wanting to restore the monarchy.
Whether this was an attempt to arouse partisan clamor for annexation
or a genuinely held belief is difficult to say.

Whatever the reason,

the Senate was not yet ready to commit itself to an unequivocable ex
pansionist program.
While the debates on the Hawaiian question continued, another
equally vexatious problem was developing in Cuba.

The same Wilson-

Gorman Tariff which had returned prosperity to Hawaii in l89i*-95 had
the opposite affect on the Cuban economy since it reimposed the duties
of the pre-McKinley Tariff days on Cuban sugar.

This caused unstable

economic conditions in Cuba and led to a guerrilla uprising xdiich would
)^
not end until the Spanish-American War.
The uprising was directed against Spanish colonial rulers but
American property was also destroyed^ with the intention of forcing
the United States to intervene.
The Committee on Foreign Relations of which Frye was a ranking
member
gents.^

recommended that the United States recognize the Cuban insur
During the ensuing discussion, Frye approved the proposal.

"I have but one desire, and that is to see Cuba an independent republic^
and whatever I can do justly and honorably to that end I am prepared to

1*3. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, (New York: Houghton-Mifflin Co.,
1951), p. 1*1*.
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James T. Adams, Epic of A m erica, (Boston: Little-Brown and Co.,

1931), p. 335.
1*5. Frye had just refused the chairmanship of the committee and also
had just been elected Pres. Pro. Tempore of the Senate. Dennison,
o£. cit., p. 99.
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Cong. R e c ., f>l* Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1886.
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do."^7

A few months previously he wanted to "seize and hold Cuba

against the world."
In the meantime the revolutionists were taking advantage of the
American sympathy for their cause by sending filibustering expeditions
from American shores.

Although American vigilance succeeded in stop

ping about two-thirds of these endeavors the Spanish charged that
United States' assistance alone was keeping the revolt a l i v e . S p a i n
diligently checked vessels for contraband and as is inevitable in such
cases made errors.
ance.

One such error involved the American vessel Alli

The Alliance was on route from Colon, Columbia, and upon enter

ing the Caribbean Sea was pursued by a Spanish search vessel.

The

Spanish ship fired on the Alliance and though no shot reached its target the incident inflamed American opinion.

k9

Many newspapers imme

diately demanded punitive measures and some called for annexation of
Cuba.

Godkin of the Nation opposed this emotional outburst and said

of Frye, "War for war's sake has no warmer friend."'’®

Frye was re

ported to have regretted the peaceful solution of the Allianca affair
and to have preferred war.

A s a matter of fact, Frye opposed American

interception of any of the filibustering expeditions.

It made him

"weary and heartsick" to see the United States doing "police duty for

1*7.

Ibid., p. 221*9.

1*8. Orestes Farrara, The Last Spanish W a r , (New York: Paisley Press,
1937), p. 36.
1*9. Joseph Wisan, The Cuban Crises as Reflected in the New York Press,
(New York: Columbia University Press., 193ii), P P . 70-71.
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the most wicked despotism ... on e a r t h . A n d

if his position re

mained in doubt, he caused all speculation to cease by declaring, "I
shall do or say or vote anything, consistent with honor and integrity
-- which shall promote the success of the Cuban patriots who are -—
struggling to wrest liberty from the iron grasp of a cruel and ref>2
lentless despotism.”
As the election of 1896 approached, free Cuba subsided and into
the vacuum came "free silver."

Frye was being mentioned as a Vice-

Presidential candidate and McKinley was reported as saying Frye was
his choice,

l i n e ' s eyes, however, were on Tom Reed who was seeking

the Republican nomination for President.
chieved success.

Neither Frye nor Reed a-

The Vice-Presidency went to Garret Hobart of New

Jersey. /Frye*s daughter married Hobart's son J
Frye gave his usual amount of speeches but did not command the
headlines as he once had.

His efforts were centered against the free

silverites, but it appears that even this issue did not inspire him
too greatly.

53

When Congress convened in December of 1896, Cleveland

was a "lame duck" and Republican hopes for expansion had resumed its
old vigor.
No sooner had William McKinley taken office than his Republican
colleagues in the Senate began to needle him to lead the Republican
forces in an attempt to annex Hawaii.

On March 15, 1897, Frye had
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seen the President and apparently received encouragement for this
plan.

Earlier in February, Frye had advocated a $100,000 ^>propria-

tion for the improvement of Pearl Harbor with hopes of increasing
Hawaiian dependency on the United States.

Some papers assailed him

for this proposal and one called him a "pirate and a common thief"
claiming that Captain Kidd had used the same methods.

He did not want

to improve the harbor but rather to claim an American act of sovereign
ty t h ere.^

In short, Frye was using the technique of "dollar diplo

macy" before the term originated twenty years later.
In Cuba the situation was worsening.
ate the tension had f a i l e d . ^

Spanish attempts to allevi

As new outbreaks of violence occurred,

Fitzhugh Lee, American consul-general in Havana, asked that ships be
made ready in the event destruction of American property and lives
took place.

However, he assured his superior that they would not be

needed at that time.

Despite this assurance by Lee, the battleship

Maine was ordered to Havana January

2h,

1898.

Public enthusiasm was at a fever pitch.

Yellow journalists were

reporting the Cuban news and when there was no news to report, they in
vented some.

Hundreds of prominent citizens were giving speeches for

Cuban independence or annexation.
complex.

Frye's every utterance had a Cuban

He spoke at many meetings of national organizations and

enumerated Spanish abuses while calling for intervention . 50
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In all the furor over Cuba, i’rye did not forget Hawaii.
dressed the Manufacturers Association of New York in February

He ad

1898,

and urged those present to exercise their influence upon the Senate
for annexation of Hawaii.
Hawaiian market.

59

If they did not, they surely would lose the

In January, he had been quoted as wanting to

"seize" Hawaii so that other interested nations could not annex t h e m , ^
and some Maine newspapers agreed with h i m . ^
While the Maine lay in Havana harbor an almost melodramatic in
cident occurred in the United States, the infamous de Lome Letter
fiasco.

In Maine, at least, people tended to blame no one but de Lome

for his indiscretion, but as time went on this attitude changed to involving Spain directly with the letter.

62

No sooner had the de Lome

furor subsided than the country went into a frenzy with the help of
Heart's N ew York World.

The Maine had blown up or had been blown up

while it innocently lay at anchor!
At first the Maine explosion was greeted with mixed emotions.
Senator aale, Frye's compatriot from Maine, was certain that it was an
accident and voiced his disapproval of extremists who clamored for
war.^”* Congressman Boutelle, who owned an interest in the Bangor Whig
and Courier, sponsored a measure which offered condolences to the
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families of those who lost their lives on the Maine. ^

Boutelle was

opposed to war being one of the three that refused to vote for the
declaration of war in April,

He felt the pressure from his constit

uents and publicly declared that "every Congressman had two or three
newspapers in his district - most of them printed in red ink -- and
shouting for b l o o d . D e s p i t e

these pressures, the Whig pleaded for

moderation and lamented the Congressional preparations for war.

66

Fpye, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had
been close to the Cuban situation since 1895.

Since 1896, the commit

tee had been conducting investigations attesting to gain information
about the insurgents.

It continued its investigations by probing the

cause of the Maine disaster.

The committee had recently advocated

intervention; its present investigation was essentially one to find
further justification for intervention.

Despite the fact that the

official board of inquiry did not find Spain guilty of sabotage, Frye,
as a member of the subcommittee questioned the witnesses with a manner
suggesting that Spain had deliberately blown up the Maine.

His sub

sequent actions and public statements indicated that his knowledge of
Cuban affairs was based solely on his interrogation of the witnesses
as a member of the subcommittee.

The results of the subcommittee's

investigation were embodied in a resolution, Frye concurring, proposing
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the independence of C u b a . ^
Shortly after the report was issued, Senator Proctor of Vermont
returned to Washington from a trip to Cuba where he had observed the
revolution first hand.

Proctor's report depicting Spanish brutality

and maladministration, served only to accentuate the already bellicose
atmosphere of the country.

A decade later one unidentifiable source

alleged that Frye had literally dragged Proctor from the Senate cloak
room to deliver this inflammatory speech.

It was reported that Proctor

did not want to give such a report because he realized the probable
affects of such action.
On March 29, Frye and Senator Rawlins introduced a "startling
resolution" which was only a portent of the pressures to be applied to
President McKinley during the next three weeks in an attempt to get
the President to declare war,
"Resolved, by the Senate and House of the Republic
of the United States of America in Congress assembled
that the independence of the Republic of Cuba be and
the same is hereby declared, and the President is
hereby authorized and directed to employ the land and
naval forces of the United States of America to wage
such a war to success . "68
Congressman Boutelle's Bangor Whig called this resolution ill-ad69
vised and censured Frye for his jingoism.

Theodore Roosevelt, how

ever, congratulated Frye on his aggressiveness but directed Frye to
"keep this note private."
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As the days passed, Senator Frye continued to press for inter
vention.

Reportedly he and three others visited President McKinley to

urge the President to ask the Senate for a declaration of war imraediately.

71

Frye's belligerancy was not totally approved by his Maine

constituents.

Leading Portland businessmen sent Frye a letter en

dorsing McKinley's policy of watchful waiting but the Senator continued
to assure the men that the Foreign Relations Committee would "do noth72
ing rashly.'"

Less than a week later the Portland Press reminded

Frye that the cause of the Maine's destruction was undetermined and
the reasons for a war with Spain were ill-defined.

Therefore, it

urged a reconsideration of the whole attitude toward war
Business, in general, opposed w a r . ^

This is a likely explanation

why Senator Hale supported McKinley's policy, and clearly explains
nd

Mark Hanna's opposition to war . ' 3

Frye had consistently agreed with

Hanna and other business leaders on Republican economic programs.

It

is difficult to explain, therefore, why Frye at this time should pur
sue such an independent course.

In Maine, Senators were still elected

by the legislature which had traditionally been controlled by commer
cial and industrial interests.
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On April ill, the Foreign Relations Committee's resolution demand
ing independence or war was introduced by Frye; the Senate was in pandemonium.'

The Teller Amendment was quickly passed to discourage im

perial designs of annexation but not without words from Frye who wish
ed to leave the disposition of Cuba until a later date.

It is clear

that he desired annexation rather than the independence of Cuba.

771

Finally, April 19, 1898, Congress passed a joint resolution that
was tantamount to a declaration of war on Spain.

Frye voted for the

resolution while Hale and Boutelle voted against it.

The Whig praised

Boutelle for his courage in opposing such drastic action and praised
the "State of Maine" which it said had cut "a very creditable figure
throughout the Cuban controversy ... excepting ... the jingoistic
7fi
tendencies of Senator Frye."

This was, indeed, mild talk compared to

Frye's speech of April 19, which spearheaded the final vote for war.
Lamenting the indecisiveness of Congress, he called for prompt action.
"I have been silent all through this discussion
because I wanted action, now for God's sake let us
do something to relieve those poor people in Cuba.
I believe that if we act now within ten days, Cuba
will be free; provisions will be there for the starv
ing and if not our guns will be thundering at Morro
Castle."79
These are contradictory words from a man who, three years before,
had risen to "true statesmanship" after the Allianca incident by saying:
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"I had almost hoped that Spain would assume
such an arrogant and belligerent tone that it
would be necessary for the United States to
round out our possessions as they should be,
and if we cannot buy it, I for one should like
gq
to have an opportunity to acquire it by conquest."
Shortly after war was officially declared, Frye paid a visit to
Secretary of the Navy Long, a Maine native, asking for vessels to pro
tect the coast of Maine from Spanish ships.

Long regarded this request
81

as an imposition and apparently did not act on it.

The request, in

retrospect, seems little more than ridiculous since Spain's fleet was
pathetically small and inefficient; besides, it had all it could
handle in the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Again, a rather obvious in

consistency arises when one compares Frye's fear of attack and his
earlier statement that Cuba would be free in ten days, implying that
Spain was militarily destitute.
The atmosphere generated by the war had succeeded in raising
Americanism to heights not unlike most wars.

Hawaiian annexation had

been blocked for years because in peacetime a more diverse public
opinion was tolerated.

Now, however, the time was right except for one

obstacle, Thomas B. Reed.
on many issues with him.

Reed had never liked Frye nor did he agree
Reed, as chairman of the Committee on Rules

of the House, controlled the consideration of a Hawaiian annexation
bill.

For three weeks against unbearable pressures from both public

80. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
1931), p. 29.
81. Lawerence Mayo, ed., America of Yesterday, Journal of John D .
Long. (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1923), p. 185.
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On

opinion and his Republican colleagues, Reed blocked this bill .1
Finally on July

6, I898,

nawaii was annexed and Frye rejoiced to see

one of his long sought proposals become a reality.

A precedent for

expansion beyond the continental boundaries had been established.
The "boy scout war" was short-lived.
sure, if a doubt had ever existed.

%

August the outcome was

Would the United States follow the

Hawaiian precedent by annexing Cuba and the Philippines?

President

McKinley appointed his peace commission in the middle of August.

Three

members of the Foreign Relations Committee were selected, Frye, Davis,
and Gray.

Whitelaw Reid, editor of the Mew York Tribune, and Secretary

of State Day completed the commission.

Only Senator Gray, a Democrat,

Q O

was known to be an anti-imperialist .0-5
Frye was reluctant to serve as a peace commissioner and if he had
known that Senator Davis preferred Theodore Roosevelt to him, he might
never have gone to Paris.
Official negotiations began in Paris October
treaty was signed on December 10.
ing the delicate Cuban question.

1 , 1898,

and the

Nearly a month was consumed discuss
On October 31, the vexing and per

plexing Philippine question came under discussion.

United States

policy regarding the Philippines had not been established by a formal
statement.

82.

President McKinley had stated that he would accept no less

Pratt (1898), pp. 315-325.

83. N.Y.T., August 27, I 898.
pansionist.
QU.

Frye was labeled a jingo and an ex

Thomas Beer, Hanna, (New York: A. Knopf,

1929),

p. 208.
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than Luzon .^
At first, Frye's position was vague.

In an interview before going

to Paris he stated that Puerto Rico and the Ladrone Islands must be
annexed by the United States.

To a question asking him if he would

demand more than Luzon and Manila he replied, "there are other islands
in the Philippines that are valuable.

The commissioners can, you

understand, exact whatever trade benefits they wish."

86

After a meet

ing with the other commissioners in President McKinley's office, he
and Davis talked about dividing the islands; only Reid wished to take
ft7
the entire archipelago .0

A t Paris, both Fiye and Davis joined Reid

88
in demanding the cession of the entire Philippine Islands.
changed his mind remains a mystery.

,

Why he

It was, no doubt, this fact which

helped to change President McKinley's original demand of just Luzon to
demand that all the islands were to be taken (with the help of Divine
Providence, of course).
The Spanish commissioners balked at American demands for the en
tire Philippine Islands and negotiations broke down.

At this juncture,

Senator Frye made one of the most important moves of the entire de
liberations.

He sent a telegram to President Cleveland via Mr. A. A.

Adee (State Department aide) informing him of the precariousness of the
negotiations.

He warned that Spain had already conceded all that her

85.

Foreign Relations, 1898, pp. 905-907.

86.

Lewiston Journal, August 25 or 26, 1898, p. ?

87.

Pratt, ojo. cit.. p.

88.

U.S. Foreign Relations, 1898, (Washingtons G.P.O., 1899), pp. 932-

933 •

332.
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people would possibly accept; so could not the United States offer
Spain a slight inducement which would placate the Spanish people while
gaining America's desired ends?
"Might we not agree to pay Spain from $10,000,000
to $20,000,000 if thus a treaty could be secured?
If no treaty then war, a continued disturbance of
business, an expenditure of a million dollars a day,
and further loss of l i f e -- If war is resumed, I
hope orders will be given to seize at once all of
the Philippine Islands, also the Carolines.1' ^
Two days later, Secretary of State John Hay called Frye to pro
ceed with the negotiations along the lines proposed in Frye's telegram*
If money would save a treaty then use money but do not sacrifice na90
tional honor were Hay's instructions .
tions proceeded on this basis.

The remainder of the negotia

Spain, toward the end of the delibera

tions, desired free entry into Philippine ports if the islands were to
be given to the United States.

Frye emphatically opposed t h i s r e -

. 91
quest.
B y the terms of the treaty Spain ceded the Philippines, Puerto

Rico, and Guam to the United States.
Spanish sovereignty.

Cuba was to become free from

The final settlement provided that Spain receive

$20,000,000 in exchange for the Philippines.^
The commissioners returned to the United States and were met with
a mixed reception.

After reading Frye's account of the proceedings in

89. Ibid., p. 939. Frye to Adee. October 30, 1898, Sunday midnight.
(Author's italics, my underlining).
90. Ibid.. Hay to Frye, November 1, 1898. i'he U.S. could not clan the
Philippines by right of conquest since Manila was captured after the
war ended.
91. Ibid., p. 962. Spain eventually gained a ten year guarantee of
port privileges. Pratt, op. cit., p. 3l*0 .
92. Pratt, op. cit., pi 3fe.---
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When the treaty was ratified on February
Senator Hoar and Hale voted against it.
escaped a complete break on this issue.

98

6,

1899, only two Republicans,

Frye and Hale narrowly

99

The United States had broken with its traditional isolationism
and had, briefly at least, entered the arena of power politics.

Frye

perfectly reflected this chauvinistic, expansionistic age and philos
ophy.

98.

Ibid., p. 358.

99.- Thomas B. Reed, even more irate at Frye and hi. s colleagues than
Hale, resigned the Speakership of the House and retired permanently
from politics because of his disgust with the treaty.

Chapter VI
AN END OF AN ERA
Not much material of historical dependability is available about
the personal and professional relationships of William P. Frye.

It

would be extremely hazardous, therefore, to draw from the material
that is aval lable any definite conclusions regarding this side of
Frye's career.

However, the author feels that it is necessary to fill

in a few of the obvious gaps and to attempt to place Frye in an his
torical relationship with his colleagues and with their times.
Criticisms and compliments of Frye by his associates tended to
follow party lines.

His Republican friends apparently liked him and

thought him amicable but the records fail to reveal that they consider
ed him a party giant or even a great man.

Chauncey Depew, Senator from

New York and a friend of big business, described Frye as a remarkable
man, always honest and frank in his personal relationships and a great
legislator.'*'

However, considering his long and undistinguished career

such value judgments from Depew are of questionable validity.
Shelby Cullum described Frye as follows:
Frye held the respect of the people of his state
to a greater degree than any other Maine statesman,
except Blaine. As Chairman of the Committee on Com
merce he was familiar with every question pertaining
to rivers and harbors, the shipping interests, and
the multitude of matters coming before the Committee....
It was his custom to report a bill from his Com
mittees... and ask for its immediate consideration.
No one ever objected, and the bill went through as a
meritorius measure without qiestion, on his word

1.

Chauncey Depew, My Memories of Eighty Years (New York: Scribners
p. 178-180.
--------------------*

1922),

9k
alone to the Senate.
Many of the positions Frye held were due to seniority but he
filled them capably.
ate three times,

He was elected president pro-tempore of the Sen

1896, 1901,
3

vice in that office.

and

1907,

a total of fifteen years ser-

In addition, he served as president of the Sen

ate for six years because of the death of Vice-President Garret Hobart
in 1899 and the assassination of President McKinley in 1901.

For his

long and distinguished service as presiding officer, his colleagues
presented him a loving cup "that he cherished until his death.
It is from his death notices that a more complete estimate of
Frye can be drawn.

Maine newspapers naturally eulogized him.

One, in

describing Frye's opposition to drinking, declared, "...not John B,
Gough, or Sam Jones, or General Dow himself hold a nobler reoord in
defense of prohibition than ... Frye.
greatest men Maine ever reared."'’
young men will miss him....
lucrative positions..

Senator Frye was one of the

Another paper emphasized that "the

He aided a great many of them in securing

and his own Lewiston papers carried front

page headlines.^
It is not Maine newspapers, however, that record a mature and

2. Shelby Cullum, $0 Years of Public Service. (New York: A.C. McClurg
and co., 1911), p. 3k5.
3.

Charles Lingley, Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, p. 5l.

1*.

Lewiston Journal. August

5.

B.W. and C .. August 10, 1911, p. 1.

6.

Bangor Commercial, August

7*

Lewiston S u n . August 9, 1911, p.l. Lewiston Journal. August

P. 2.

11 , 1911,

p.

12 , 1911,

p.

1.

1.
9, 1911 ,
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sensitive evaluation of Frye.

The Nation, which had opposed Frye on a

number of crucial issues in the past, conceded that he was a remarkable
man, able and learned in diplomatic relations and in law, but "whose
vision narrowed with the passing years ... the adjective great is not
of those that suggest themselves in any review of the long, and in

g
several ways very useful, career recently ended."
Perhaps the Outlook described him best:
"Senator Frye may be described as belonging to
the better of two divisions in which conservative
leaders of a generation ago may be classed, he was
not a petty politician and yet he was a politician
in tiie main, rising sometimes to statesman like
qualities and never becoming a mere tool of great
interests. He was an indefatigable worker, a cap
able speaker, and tested by recent standards, may
be regarded as an ultra-conservative in all such
matters as the protective tariff and the contr ol
of corporations.
It can not be denied that Frye fitted this description.
not adapt to change easily.

He did

This conservatism coupled with his asso

ciation with some of the more wealthy members of the "millionaires
club", as the Senate was then known, caused him to be identified as one
of these gentlemen in both wealth and i d e a s . ^
It was David Grahm Phillips who presented to the American people
their first shocking encounter with the entrenched special privilege to
be found in American political institutions during the first years of
the twentieth century.

In 1905-1906, Phillips published a serial type

expose of some members of the Senate entitled '^reason in the Senate.

8.

Nation. August 17, 1911, p. 133.

9.

Outlook. August 19, 1911, p. 857.

10 .

Frye apparently was anything but a wealthy man

96

Phillips assailed Chauncey Depew of New York, Nelson Aldrich of Rhode
Island, and Arthur Gorman of Maryland.

He alleged that these men were

tools of big-business and were sacrificing the interests of the common
people in favor of big-business concerns which they represented.

One

installment concentrated on "Fairbanks, Hale, and Frye."
Phillips' attack on -Frye was scathing although he admitted F rye's
competence in some a r e a s . ^

Frye's ship subsidy programs were char

acterized as grabs admissable only in the "club" because the Senate
was the only legislative body not controlled b y the common man. He
H
added, Hale and Frye have their senatorial seats from legislatures
ruled by railroad interests, therefore they are but tools of the Boston and Maine."

12

entering politics.

Phillips concluded by denouncing Frye's motives for
He sits in Congress "for his dear friends in poli

tics and social life.

Those rich friends, being comfortable and in

possession of more than their share, wonder at discontent, call con
fiscation conservatism, and extol the virtue and piety of standputism."13
Phillips' charge that both Hale and Frye were "tools" of the Bos
ton and Maine would be difficult to substantiate.

Undoubtedly Frye

was attentive to that railroad's best interests; he was a member of
the board of directors of one of its branch lines from 1901 to l ? ! ! . ^

11. David Grahm Phillips, The Treason in the Senate (Stanford,
California: Academic Reprints, P.0. Box 3003), p . 9U.
12.

Ibid., p. 91;.

13.

Ibid.

lit. Fortieth Annual Report of the Board of Directors of the Maine
Central Railroad, June 30, 1901. p. 2.
'
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William Chandler, Senator from New Hampshire, conducted investigations
of the railroad and found that it controlled the legislatures of Maine,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire while it issued free passes to hun
dreds of important officials in order to secure their support.

Chandler

often remarked that New Hampshire was controlled by a dictator and
its name was the Boston and Maine .^

Frye was not a reformer at heart.

Chandler asked for his support a number of times to curb the Boston and
Maine and the general trend to consolidation by New England railroads.
Frye shrugged off such requests by declaring that he was glad to say
that he did not belong to the reformers "for generally they are only
disgruntled politicians or assistant Democrats.
Actually, in the last analysis, Frye was more progressive than his
colleague Hale.

After 1901, Hale became increasingly unpopular in the

country at-large because of his refusal to recognize the changing at
mosphere of Washington politics.

On the question of the popular elec

tion of senators, Hale voted with other New England senators in oppo
sition, while the "aged and infirm" Frye concluded that the people
were determined to have it and so expressed a willingness to go along
17
with public sentiment.
From 1905 to 1911 Frye remained in the Senate but little of the
old vigor remained.
eighty.

On August

His wife had died and he was nearing the age of

8,

1911, having spent forty years as a member of

Maine's congressional delegation, Frye died at his home in Lewiston,

15.

Richardson, o£. cit., p. Ibid., pp. 617-625.

16.

Ibid., p. 682i.

17.

Boston Herald. August

11 , 1911 ,

p.

1
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Maine.

When notified of Frye's death, President Taft lamented, "the

Lord seems to be against the Republican party for that means another
Democrat and at once."

1R

What Taft did not realize was that not

Divine Providence but public sentiment was against the "old guard".
Frye's death served only to emphasize the passing of a generation which
had lived so comfortably with the inconsistencies of democracy in
theory and plutocracy in practice.

18 . Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New
York: Farrar-Rinehart Go., 1939), Vol. 2, p . 623.
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